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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Innovation permeates modern society. This perception is easily confirmed through 
the inspection of nearly all modern company mission statements in which 
innovation is viewed as the key modus operandi for modern organizations. In 
addition, the public sector has made innovation critical, and countries spend vast 
amounts of resources to acquire top positions in international innovation rankings 
such as the Innovation Union Scoreboard managed by the European Commission 
(EC) or the Global Innovation Index co-published by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). 
Acknowledging the importance of innovation for economic growth and 
technological change (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Griliches, 1979; Romer, 1990) as 
well as recognizing innovation as a crucial source for firms’ competitive 
advantage (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), policy makers have developed various 
policy instruments to stimulate innovation. However, the effects of public 
intervention are not obvious; for instance, public subsidies could merely crowd 
out private spending, resulting in no net increase in overall investments in 
research and development (R&D). This dissertation evaluates two general 
innovation policies by investigating the role of public R&D subsidies and R&D 
collaboration focused on fostering innovation. By elucidating these two policies, 
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this thesis’ objective is to advance the understanding of the mechanisms through 
which innovation in the private sector can be stimulated by public innovation 
policies. Moreover, these new insights will identify key managerial and policy 
implications, allowing decision makers to improve the effectiveness of these 
policies, adjust firm innovation strategies, and adjust national innovation policies. 
Since the seminal work of Schumpeter, the literature has widely acknowledged 
R&D and innovation as the main drivers of technological change in society (Dosi, 
Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg, & Soete, 1988). Firms play a crucial role for the 
discovery and diffusion of new knowledge and technology (Kogut & Zander, 
1992); however, due to the risky and uncertain nature of R&D projects (Knight, 
1921) and the non-rival and partially excludable characteristics of knowledge and 
intellectual property, an under-investment in R&D activities occurs (Arrow, 1962; 
Nelson, 1959). Firms cannot often fully appropriate the returns of their 
investments due to spillovers and imitation. Consequently, R&D and innovation 
activities are subject to market failure (Arrow & Lind, 1970; Martin & Scott, 
2000; Romer, 1990).  
As a response to the market failures, governments use various instruments to 
support R&D in the private sector.1 These instruments include direct subsidies, 
                                                 
1 In addition to supporting R&D in the private sector, governments can also stimulate 
R&D in the public sector through direct investments in R&D at universities and state-
funded research organizations. These governmental budgets for public R&D largely 
exceed the financial support for R&D in the private sector.  
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tax incentives, lower interest rates, and modifications to intellectual property or 
anti-trust and competition laws. Moreover, many countries have also launched 
special programs or have established agencies to directly fund R&D and 
innovation projects in the private sector. For instance, in the United States (USA), 
the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program has provided financial 
support for many projects run by small and young innovative firms in the private 
sector (Audretsch, 2003; Audretsch, Link, & Scott, 2002; Lerner, 2000; Wallsten, 
2000). By means of the abovementioned policy instruments, governments attempt 
to close the gap between the social and the private equilibrium in R&D 
investment and thereby gain competitive advantages in a global economy.  
Governments have increasingly engaged in stimulating R&D and innovation in 
recent decades. Thus, the EC introduced the objective that EU countries should 
target spending 3% of their gross domestic product (GDP) for R&D, as 
formulated in the Lisbon strategy at the European Council in 2000. The EC has 
renewed this goal in its Europe 2020 strategy, highlighting it as one of the key 
targets for the European Union and specifying that the investment goals should be 
attained “in particular by improving the conditions for R&D investment by the 
private sector” (EC, 2010). Providing an overview of the amount of expenditures 
invested in R&D activities as a percentage of national GDP, an international 
comparison conducted by Eurostat reports that certain countries such as South 
Korea, Finland, Sweden, Japan and Denmark ranked above the 3% level in 2011 
(Eurostat, 2013). Switzerland, also one of the leading countries in terms of R&D 
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intensity, used 2.96% of its GDP in 2012. With respect to Switzerland, 
approximately two-thirds of the R&D expenditures stems from the private sector 
(2.05% of GDP) and one-third from the public sector (0.85%) in 2013. With 
0.85%, the Swiss governmental R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP is above 
the EU average (0.73%), but remains below the levels of South Korea (1.09 %, 
2010 data), Finland 1.09 %, United States (1.02 %, 2010 data) and Germany (0.90 
%, 2010 data).  
The discussion of the effects of innovation policies at the micro and macro 
level remains ongoing (Grilli & Murtinu, 2011; Klette, Møen, & Griliches, 2000). 
In particular, a deeper understanding of whether policy instruments are able to 
facilitate successful innovations and enhance social welfare is needed (Martin & 
Scott, 2000). Additionally, it is important to remember that public interventions 
do not come without costs. Although this observation is obvious with respect to 
direct subsidies, it also holds when policymakers intervene in market structures by 
allowing R&D collaboration. Regarding direct R&D subsidies, it is of general 
interest to investigate whether taxpayers’ money is used in an efficient manner; in 
addition, interestingly, is whether the public sector is able to effectively orient 
innovation efforts towards socially desirable outcomes. Answers to the questions 
issued in this thesis provide additional arguments in the current discussion of the 
role of the public sector within innovation systems (Mazzucato, 2014).  
With respect to direct R&D subsidies, this thesis first addresses the question of 
whether the direct subsidy scheme under review is effective in confronting the 
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problems related to market failure in R&D investments, and consequently whether 
this policy helps to increase private investments in R&D activities. Second, this 
study evaluates the appropriateness of the subsidy policy to stimulate innovations 
with high degrees of novelty. This specific question concerning where the policy 
effects are most effective is crucial for policymakers. Although the policy is 
effective in terms of increasing overall R&D investments, it is interesting to know 
whether the policy follows the economic rationale that effects should be highest 
where the market is weakest; and this market failure applies particularly to 
projects of a more radical nature. Furthermore, with respect to overall economic 
growth, it is of general interest for policymakers to investigate whether the policy 
fosters more incremental or radical innovations. These important questions have 
not been addressed by the literature thus far.  
 With respect to R&D collaboration, the question remains whether the benefits 
outbalance the costs related to these joint activities in strategic alliances 
(Caloghirou, Ioannides, & Vonortas, 2003; Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Gulati 
& Singh, 1998; Kogut, 1988; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Tsang, 2000; 
Williamson, 1989). On the one hand, by means of R&D collaboration, firms can 
benefit from greater efficiency in R&D in terms of higher joint financial 
resources, avoiding the duplication of efforts, complementing their own 
capabilities, and internalizing spillovers within the consortium (Grimpe & Kaiser, 
2010). These activities enable firms to undertake not only larger but also more 
risky projects. On the other hand, collaborating firms encounter higher risks such 
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as leakage of knowledge due to involuntary outgoing spillovers, unsatisfactory 
mechanisms of appropriating the returns of joint R&D, and ineffective IP 
practices, all of which highlight the considerable weaknesses and pitfalls of 
openness in organizations (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; Henkel, 2006; Katila, 
Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008).  
Consequently, the growing interest in openness within collaborative innovation 
deserves more attention with regard to the role of inter-organizational structures 
of knowledge creation and exchange. In-depth knowledge concerning both the 
opportunities and pitfalls of openness in organizations is needed. Therefore, 
indeed, the current literature calls for more research to better understand optimal 
organizational structures that explains how to integrate knowledge from external 
partners into organizations (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Dahlander & Gann, 
2010; Laursen & Salter, 2014; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010; Sampson, 2007; Wallin 
& Von Krogh, 2010). Specifically, answers to questions such as “What are 
optimal levels of diversity of collaboration partners in strategic R&D alliances?” 
and “What are appropriate portfolios of external partners to generate specific 
types of innovation outcomes?” remain unanswered. In addition, very little is 
known regarding dynamic adaptation of collaboration networks (Bakker & 
Knoben, 2014). To advance the knowledge in this field, this thesis investigates 
first, the effects of diversity of collaboration partner types within strategic 
alliances on innovation performance; and second, the role of simultaneous and 
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dynamic adaptation of strategic R&D alliances to generate specific types of 
innovation is studied.  
The following three chapters present my contribution to the on-going policy 
evaluation in the form of an empirical analysis conducted in three papers. The first 
paper, Radical or incremental: Where does R&D policy hit? (Chapter 2), 
investigates the impact and effectiveness of a public R&D support policy, which 
directly funds R&D projects in the private sector. The objective of this paper is to 
contribute to the debate on the returns of public R&D funding (Jones & Williams, 
1998; Salter & Martin, 2001) and to analyze whether public money is used in the 
most effective manner (David & Hall, 2000; David, Hall, & Toole, 2000; Klette et 
al., 2000). Specifically, this empirical analysis evaluates whether a public subsidy 
has differentiated effects in regard to incremental or radical innovation, an aspect 
that has been largely ignored in the literature. The results demonstrate that the 
Swiss public R&D policy is effective in terms of increasing private R&D 
investment as well as stimulating innovations of a more radical nature. However, 
the feature of the policy targeted at encouraging firms to engage in R&D 
collaboration does not appear to further enhance these effects. 
The second paper, Cooperating with external partners: the importance of 
diversity for innovation performance (Chapter 4), explores how diversity in 
Introduction 
8 
strategic R&D alliances affects firms’ innovation performance.2 This study 
contributes to the debate on the benefits and downsides of collaboration within 
strategic alliances (Grimpe & Kaiser, 2010; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Laursen & 
Salter, 2014). To do so, this study seeks to enlarge the current understanding of 
specific aspects regarding the relationship between diversity in collaboration 
partner types and innovation performance. However, the results suggest that 
higher diversity in strategic alliances is associated with increased innovation 
performance to a certain degree of diversity. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first empirical study that detects a curvilinear relationship between diversity in 
collaboration partner types and innovation performance; this indicates decreasing 
marginal effects. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that, in particular, small 
firms can benefit more from diversity in their innovation activities. 
The third paper, Innovation outcomes and partner type selection in R&D 
alliances: The role of simultaneous diversification and sequential adaptation 
(Chapter 5), focuses on inter-organizational structures of knowledge exchange and 
technology transfer within R&D alliances. Contrary to previous literature in this 
field, which has mainly ignored dynamic aspects of partner type adaptation within 
R&D alliances, this study accounts for the sequential adaptation of firms’ 
collaboration patterns. In addition, this study seeks to advance the understanding 
                                                 
2 This paper has been published in a thematic issue on Human Resource Management 
(HRM) and firm innovativeness in a European context in the European Journal of 
International Management. 
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of whether different innovation outcomes, such as radical or incremental 
innovations, are related to specific structures of inter-organizational knowledge 
exchange. The empirical findings demonstrate that firms should not remain 
excessively persistent within the same search activities and that non-adapting 
collaboration patterns are associated with inferior innovation performance. 
Moreover, this study highlights the presence of important partner type selectivity 
and helps to identify appropriate knowledge exchange structures in relation to 
specific innovation outcomes and firm sizes. 
Overall, this dissertation’s objective is to advance the understanding of how 
innovation policies are linked to the generation of innovation in firms. This thesis 
particularly focuses on the role of direct R&D subsidies and R&D collaboration. 
From a policy perspective, the new insights should help to explore and identify 
effective policy designs for R&D subsidies and collaborations to stimulate 
innovations. From a managerial perspective, this thesis provides meaningful 
implications for managers in the field of strategic R&D alliances. In particular, 
this research derives certain interesting insights regarding the effective structures 
of knowledge exchange with collaborating firms.  
Radical or incremental: Where does R&D policy hit?  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Radical or incremental: Where does R&D policy hit? 
 
This chapter is co-authored with Cindy Lopes-Bento and Andrea Schenker-Wicki. 
A version of this chapter has been revised and re-submitted to Research Policy. 
 
 
 
Abstract: This study investigates the impact and effectiveness of a public R&D 
support policy. In a policy design that aims at incentivizing radical as well as 
incremental innovations, we test where the policy impact is highest. While the 
privately motivated R&D expenditures are significant for both types of 
innovation, the policy-induced part is significant only for radical innovation. 
Furthermore, given that the funding agency encourages collaboration, and 
particularly industry-science collaboration, we further test whether effects are 
enhanced in collaborating firms. We do not find any evidence pointing to 
increased effects for the latter. 
Keywords: R&D subsidies; collaborative innovation; innovation performance; 
radical innovation; incremental innovation; policy evaluation; treatment effects. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Innovation is largely acknowledged to be a main factor of a country’s sustainable 
and competitive development (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Griliches, 1990; Romer, 
1990). It is also recognized that due to market imperfections, firms are unlikely to 
reap all the benefits from their research, leading to underinvestment in R&D in 
the economy. Therefore, governmental support is a widely accepted means to 
foster socially valuable innovation.  
The concept of market imperfection goes back to Nelson (1959) and Arrow 
(1962), who state that firms do not invest the socially desired level in R&D efforts 
due to market imperfections including limited appropriability, lower private than 
social returns, financial market constraints, high risks about technological 
standards, high costs and high uncertainty of R&D projects and further forms of 
negative externalities (Martin & Scott, 2000). The implications of this under-
investment in R&D have encouraged policy makers to establish public support 
mechanisms. In the current paper, we are interested in one particular type of 
support, namely direct funding for R&D projects. More precisely, we aim at 
contributing to an on-going debate about the returns of public R&D funding 
(Jones & Williams, 1998; Salter & Martin, 2001), and in particular about whether 
public money is used in the most effective way (David & Hall, 2000; David et al., 
2000; Klette et al., 2000). In order to do so, we investigate the impact of the Swiss 
public support policy on outcome characteristics that have so far largely been 
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ignored in this stream of literature. Specifically, we analyze where the policy 
effect is highest: incremental or radical innovation.  
Based on the market failure theory stipulating that under-investment in R&D 
may be particularly pronounced for more radical innovations because of higher 
uncertainty linked to such projects, one may expect to see an effect of public 
support on radical rather than on incremental innovation. Indeed, as shown by 
Karlsson, Friis, and Paulsson (2004) for instance, there is a higher probability of 
no returns on investment for more radical innovation when compared to 
incremental innovation. Likewise, given the riskier nature of such projects, firms 
may have more difficulties to find external funding (see e.g. Kamien & Schwartz, 
1978). As a consequence, given that funding agencies want to stimulate projects, 
which are socially desirable but would not be undertaken without public support, 
one would assume that the impact is particularly pronounced for the latter. In the 
case of the Swiss innovation policy, the goal is however not merely destined at 
promoting frontier breaking innovation but also to maintain or enhance the 
competitiveness of the recipient firms, which can be achieved through incremental 
and radical innovations alike. It is therefore of high interest to know if the created 
impact is the same for both types of projects or if one type yields more returns 
than the other.  
For the policy maker, such information is crucial in order to optimize the 
policy structure. Indeed, it is essential to know if the ex-ante project evaluation is 
appropriate to prevent firms from crowding-out of private R&D expenditures due 
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to public R&D funding. Consequently, in a first step, we investigate the 
effectiveness of the policy scheme and test if the subsidy leads to higher R&D 
expenditures. In a second step, we analyze how this policy induced R&D 
expenditures translate into innovation output, differentiating between radical and 
incremental innovation. Indeed, even in case of positive input additionality 
(meaning higher R&D expenditures due to the subsidy), it remains unclear if the 
policy induced R&D is as productive as the privately induced R&D. Indeed, 
based on portfolio maximization theory, firms spent their private money first on 
projects with the highest expected returns. In case of equal (or even higher) 
productivity, it remains so far indeterminate whether the impact is highest for 
more radical or more incremental innovation projects. Therefore, a first and main 
contribution of this paper lies in disentangling the effects of privately invested and 
publicly induced R&D on innovation outcome, according to the degree of novelty 
of the products.  
Our second contribution pertains to taking into account the firms’ collaboration 
status. It has been proven that R&D collaboration is likely to impact innovation 
performance due to spillover effects, risk and cost sharing. Collaboration is 
therefore encouraged by the funding agency. Taking collaboration as well as the 
type of collaboration into account is therefore crucial as it can advise policy 
makers on the efficiency of this policy criterion. Within the various collaboration 
types, the Swiss funding agency particularly encourages collaboration with 
science. Shedding light on whether collaboration has an important impact on 
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innovation outcome as well as what type of collaboration (i.e. is it mainly science, 
as encouraged by the agency or do other partners also play a role?) seems 
therefore particularly relevant in this context. So far, the literature does not advice 
on this issue, as the impact of the type of partner in a subsidy scheme has not been 
analyzed in previous papers. Indeed, most papers in the evaluation literature 
merely account for R&D collaboration (if at all), but do not pay attention to 
partner diversity.  
Thirdly, the present study is undertaken on a representative sample of Swiss 
firms, which despite being considered an innovation leader among OECD 
countries, has not received as much attention as many other countries on this 
subject.  
Finally, in contrast to most policy evaluation studies, our analysis also allows 
drawing conclusions from a managerial perspective. Knowing where the impact 
of an R&D subsidy is highest in order for them to best adapt grant application 
efforts to innovation strategies plays indeed an important role. Likewise, knowing 
whether input and/or output additionality is enhanced through collaboration (as 
well as through the type of partner) seems essential information for a manager to 
optimize its R&D project portfolio. 
We base our analysis on a representative firm-level data-set covering the 
period from 1999 to 2011 of the Swiss innovation survey. We find that, on 
average, the receipt of an R&D subsidy translates into higher R&D investment. In 
terms of innovation performance, we find that the impact of public support is only 
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significant for radical innovation, while no impact of policy-induced R&D is 
found for incremental innovation. Privately financed R&D on the other hand is 
significant for both types of innovation. In terms of collaboration, we do not find 
evidence that the impact of the policy is improved through collaboration. We can 
thus conclude that while the Swiss public R&D policy is efficient in terms of 
stimulating R&D investment and innovation performance of more radical nature, 
the current tendency of encouraging R&D collaboration does not seem to enhance 
such effects. 
2.2 Overview of the theoretical background and previous studies 
Many countries have launched innovation policy programs to promote national 
innovativeness and competitiveness. An outstanding performance in R&D and 
innovation activities is considered an important factor not only for economic 
growth but also for a sustainable economic perspective in terms of employment, 
ecology and education for a modern knowledge society. In Switzerland, public 
funding of R&D has increased by 5.3% between 2000 and 2010. In 2010, the 
financial budget for appropriations or outlays dedicated to R&D covers an amount 
of 4.6 billion CHF, which corresponds to 0.81% of the country’s GDP. In an 
international comparison (measures from 2008), Switzerland holds the eleventh 
rank of 31 OECD countries with public R&D funding corresponding to 0.73% of 
the country’s GDP. The United States (1.02%) and Finland (0.98%) are on the top 
positions of the public funding per GDP ratio (FSO, 2012).  
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In Switzerland there are two major R&D funding agencies providing public 
grants for R&D programs and projects—the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(SNSF) and the Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI)—with a total 
budget of 1.0 billion CHF in 2010. While the SNSF is mainly in charge of 
providing public grants to R&D projects or programs conducted by public 
research institutes or by individual researchers, the CTI is the responsible funding 
agency for R&D projects in the private sector, with a total budget of 118 Mio 
CHF in 2010. As a consequence, the subsidies under review in this study mainly 
stem from the CTI. 
The subsidy scheme is not based on calls for proposals, but firms can apply 
with R&D projects all year long. Likewise, there are no restrictions in terms of 
technology fields supported by the agencies. Nonetheless, the CTI has the general 
goal to stimulate innovation in SMEs and encourages joint R&D activities 
between private companies and public research institutes. The focus of the policy 
is two-fold: on the one hand, the agency provides support for applied and market-
oriented R&D projects which lead to the generation of improved technologies and 
products to strengthen the country’s innovation position (CTI, 2011). On the other 
hand, the CTI also supports high risk but promising, cutting-edge technologies.  
As can be seen in Figure 1 on the subsidy distribution by innovation type, there is 
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hardly any difference between the numbers of subsidies going to firms with 
radical or incremental innovation output.3  
Figure 1: Subsidy distribution by innovation type 
 
Source: Own calculations. Data derived from the Innovation survey conducted by the 
Swiss Economic Institute (KOF). 
 
Applicant firms have to provide a detailed description on the project’s impact 
and a clear business and financial plan. The ex-ante evaluation is done by external 
and internal referees, which evaluate the expected effectiveness of the R&D 
projects. In 2010, 780 projects were evaluated, and 343 (44%) projects have been 
retained for public support (CTI, 2013).  
                                                 
3 The distribution of subsidies across sectors and firm size classes can be found in 
Appendix 2.8.1, Table 8 and Table 9. 
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In case of a positive evaluation, the firm receives a subsidy in form of a 
matched grant, where the public funding typically covers up to approximately 
50% of the expected costs (CTI, 2011, 2013). That is, the recipient firm always 
faces a co-financing clause by which is it held to finance half of the project costs 
from private resources. In 2010, 667 firms are involved in co-funded R&D 
projects, among which almost three quarters (74%) were SMEs (CTI, 2013). The 
average project duration is of 20 months and the average project size amounts to 
682.2 thousand Swiss francs.4 As can be seen by Table 1, the number of 
subsidized firms has remained very stable over the period under review.  
Table 1: Subsidy distribution over survey period 1999-2011. 
Year Number of firms 
Percentages of  
non-subsidized firms 
Percentages of  
subsidized firms 
1997-99 1,140 90.70 9.30 
2000-02 1,370 93.80 6.20 
2003-05 1,310 90.61 9.39 
2006-08 1,124 91.46 8.54 
2009-11 1,140 88.07 11.93 
Total 6,084 (100%) 91.03 (on average) 8.97 (on average) 
                                                 
4 Data about project duration is provided by ARAMIS, a database of the Swiss federal 
administration. 
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2.3 Our research question in light of recent literature  
2.3.1 The impact of R&D support  
Empirical evidence on R&D subsidies is common in the literature to date. In 
terms of input additionality, it has been shown that the null hypothesis of full 
crowding out can be rejected in the vast majority of cases. In other words, most 
studies find that firms receiving public support invest more in R&D than if they 
would not have been supported. The subsidy hence reaches its goal of stimulating 
R&D investment. Indeed, Hall and Maffioli (2008) have found that in empirical 
literature since 2000, total crowding out effects were only found for the US Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, analyzed by Wallsten (2000).5 
In terms of output additionality, evidence confirms that subsidies have a 
positive impact on innovation performance, as measured for instance by patent 
outcome (see e.g. Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) or Czarnitzki and Licht 
(2006)) or novelty sales (see for instance Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) for a 
sample of German firms or (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014a) for a sample of 
Belgian firms). In a recent study on Swiss firms, Arvanitis, Donze, and Sydow 
(2010) found evidence for improved innovation performance of supported firms 
with respect to six different measures of innovation performance.6 
                                                 
5 See Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) for an overview on relevant recent empirical 
studies; and Cerulli (2010) for a critical overview on the different applied methods. 
6 Their respective outcome variables include: Importance of introduced innovations from 
a technical point of view, Importance of introduced innovations from an economic point 
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Papers distinguishing the productivity effects of privately respectively publicly 
funded R&D remain limited to date. Even though Madsen, Clausen, and 
Ljunggren (2008) suggest that input and output additionality are interrelated, to 
the best of our knowledge only Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Czarnitzki and 
Licht (2006) and Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014a) consider this 
disentanglement and find a positive impact of publicly induced R&D investment 
on patenting activities in German firms and novelty sales in Belgium firms 
respectively. The latter do not differentiate between the degrees of novelty in 
innovation sales though.  
Compared to the above studies, the current analysis further considers the 
disentangled investment in light of the degree of novelty of the innovation 
outcome. As stipulated by Garcia and Calantone (2002), the difference between 
incremental and radical innovation is crucial. While radical innovations have the 
potential to push the technological frontier of a firm or even sector and may allow 
a firm to enter new markets, incremental innovations may be considered the 
“lifeblood of an organization” (p. 123) for mainly two reasons: “first as a 
competitive weapon in a technologically mature market; and second, because 
streamlined procedures based on existing technology can help alert a business in 
                                                                                                                                     
of view, Percentage reduction of average variable production costs due to process 
innovation, Sales of significantly improved or modified (already existing) products as a 
percentage of total sales, Sales of products new to the firm or to the market as a 
percentage of total sales, Sales of products new to the market worldwide as a percentage 
of total sales. 
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good times to threats and opportunities associated with the shift to a new 
technological plateau” (Johne & Snelson, 1988, p. 115). Distinguishing these two 
types of innovation therefore seems an important characteristic in a policy 
evaluation context, as it allows targeting the policy as necessary.  
While more radical innovation has a high potential to have a fundamental 
impact on firm performance, it is also often involved with higher costs and higher 
risks. It may thus well be that projects of radical nature are less likely to be 
undertaken by firms left to themselves as firms have to be willing to bear the 
inherent risk of this endeavor and also have to be able to provide the necessary 
funding. Since the assumption is that firms are often risk-averse and financially 
constrained, this could lead to a sub-optimal allocation of radical vs. incremental 
innovation (Arrow & Lind, 1970).   
Hence, it is difficult to predict ex-ante where the policy effect will be highest 
and whether the selection process of the funding agency is efficient in light of the 
type of innovation in which the additional investment will be destined to. 
2.3.2 The impact of R&D collaboration  
It has long been acknowledged that R&D collaboration plays an important role, 
for the type as well as the success of innovation projects. Allowing limiting 
outgoing spillovers by internalizing them to the research consortium and 
providing access to complementary know-how and resources of partnering firms, 
it has been shown that R&D collaboration can enhance private R&D activities 
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substantially (see for instance D'Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988; DeBondt, 1997; 
Kaiser, 2002; Kamien, Muller, & Zang, 1992; Katz, 1986).  
Subsidized collaborative R&D has received less attention though in the 
empirical literature so far. Exceptions are Sakakibara (2001) and Branstetter and 
Sakakibara (2002) who analyzed Japanese government-sponsored R&D consortia. 
Both studies found evidence that participating firms have higher R&D 
expenditures as well as more patents. Further, Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier 
(2007) apply a matching estimator in a multiple treatment setting, analyze the 
effects of R&D collaboration and public R&D funding on R&D per sales and 
patent outcomes for Germany and Finland and find that collaboration has positive 
effects. Finally, Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014a) find that in a sample of 
Belgian firms, international collaborating firms have a higher subsidy treatment 
effect than nationally or non-collaborating firms.  
The aspect of various partner types (i.e. horizontal, vertical or collaboration 
with science) within a subsidy scheme has so far not yet been analyzed in the 
evaluation literature though. However, since funding agencies often encourage 
industry-science links, having evidence on the impact of subsidized projects with 
specific partners would allow shedding new light on the efficacy of such policy 
criteria. Indeed, studies have acknowledged the role played by various partner 
types and the impact they may have on innovation performance (Belderbos, 
Carree, Diederen, Lokshin, & Veugelers, 2004a; de Faria, Lima, & Santos, 2010; 
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Faems, Van Looy, & Debackere, 2005; Kaiser, 2002). However, to date we don’t 
know yet about their impact in light of a publicly co-financed subsidy scheme.  
Before assessing the role of collaboration in an R&D subsidized context 
empirically, it is important to emphasize that collaboration may also be linked to 
certain risks.  For instance, collaborating firms run the risk of free riding of one of 
the partners, disclosing of the firms’ secrecy or weak IPR systems, rendering the 
appropriation of the returns of joint R&D projects difficult. Indeed, to be able to 
fully benefit from collaboration, a firm needs to build up specific competences 
and maintain a fruitful level of absorptive capacity to manage and coordinate 
collaborations efficiently and effectively. Otherwise, outgoing spillover effects 
might be higher than incoming spillover effects for some partners of the 
consortium, leading to the costs of collaboration being higher than the gains. 
Finally, incomplete contracts resulting from poor bargaining and costs of 
disclosure that are inherently linked to collaboration may render collaborative 
R&D costly if collaboration exceeds a certain threshold (Beck & Schenker–
Wicki, 2014; Hottenrott & Lopes-Bento, 2014b). While such caveats are always 
true, they may be particularly pronounced for subsidized collaboration agreements 
insofar that firms may conclude collaborative R&D agreements to increase the 
chances of being retained for public support rather than because of true 
complementarity of skills or know-how between partners. Furthermore, 
coordination costs may be higher in the case of subsidized collaboration 
agreements due to monitoring or reporting duties of the funding agency.  
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The present analysis precisely aims at measuring such effects, by taking the 
type of partner within the subsidy scheme into account, thereby advising whether 
encouraging R&D collaboration overall, and industry-science links in particular, 
is an efficient policy criterion. 
2.4 Methodological approach and estimation strategy  
2.4.1 Input additionality analysis 
In the first step of our analysis, we are interested in estimating the treatment effect 
of the R&D subsidies on firms’ R&D investments. As subsidies are not randomly 
distributed, one has to take the selection into the funding program into account in 
the evaluation analysis. Indeed, subsidized firms might differ from non-subsidized 
firms in important characteristics, and therefore the selection into the treatment 
has to be taken into account (Grilli & Murtinu, 2011; Heckman, LaLonde, & 
Smith, 1999; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008). While several modern econometric 
techniques exist allowing to address such a selection bias, our study applies a non-
parametric nearest neighbor propensity score matching, as this is the most 
adequate method for the data at hand in this study (to be presented in the next 
section) (Angrist, 1998; Gerfin & Lechner, 2002; Lechner, 1999; Smith & Todd, 
2005).  
The econometric matching allows to directly reply to the question of how 
much a subsidized firm would have invested in R&D if it would be in a 
counterfactual situation of not having received public support. Given that this 
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counterfactual situation is never observable, it has to be estimated. Based on the 
assumption that we observe all the important characteristics driving the selection 
into the treatment (that is, provided that the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) is respected (Rubin, 1977)), we can approximate this counterfactual 
situation by firms having the same (or very similar) characteristics than the 
subsidized firms, but have not received any support. In order to find such similar 
“twins”, we balance the subsamples of subsidized and non-subsidized firms 
according to the probability of receiving a subsidy. Based on a probit estimation, 
we obtain the conditional probability of receiving a subsidy in a single index, the 
propensity score. That means that we compare subsidized firms with firms that 
had the same probability of being subsidized, but did not receive public support. 
Based on this index, we apply a nearest neighbor matching estimation and use for 
each subsidized firm the single nearest neighbor to estimate the counterfactual 
situation (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). On top of 
matching on the propensity score, we further require firms of the treated and 
control groups to belong to the same year and the same industry.  
The average treatment effect on the treated is estimated as follows: 
𝛼𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  
1
𝑁𝑇
∑ (𝑅&𝐷𝑖
𝑇 − 𝑅&?̂?𝑖
𝑐)𝑁
𝑇
𝑖=1     (2.1) 
where R&DiT indicates R&D expenditures of treated firms and 𝑅&?̂?𝑖
𝑐  𝑡ℎ𝑒 
counterfactual situation, i.e. the potential outcome that would have been realized 
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if the treatment group (S=1) had not been treated. S 𝜖 {0,1} indicates the receipt of 
a subsidy and NT the number of treated firms.7  
2.4.2 Effectiveness of the R&D policy 
In a second part, we turn to the analysis of how the additional policy-induced 
R&D investment translates into innovation performance. More precisely, 
provided that we find positive input additionality, we want to know whether the 
publicly induced R&D investment is as productive as the privately invested R&D 
expenditures, and if such impacts differ between radical or incremental 
innovations.  
Taking into account that not every firm in our sample has new product sales in 
each period, our outcome measures are characterized by a corner solution around 
zero (Tobin, 1958). For our analysis, we therefore use Tobit models to give point 
to these censored dependent variables.  
                                                 
7 Finally, in order for the matching to be possible, enough common support is needed 
between the sample of treated firms and the sample of potential control firms. To this 
end, the samples of treated and control firms need to have enough overlap in terms of 
probability of receiving a subsidy. Observations on treated firms with probabilities larger 
than the maximum and smaller than the minimum of the potential control group will 
therefore be deleted. 
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In order to disentangle public from private R&D investment, we estimate the 
policy impact at the firm level in the same fashion as Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 
(2014a) as follows: 
𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇 = 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 − 𝑅&?̂?
𝐶
𝑖      (2.2) 
where 𝑅&?̂?𝐶𝑖 is equal to R&D intensity for the counterfactual firms. Indeed, for 
non-subsidized firms for which 𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇 is equal to zero, 𝑅&?̂?𝐶𝑖 corresponds to their 
private R&D investment. For subsidized firms, the individual treatment effect 
corresponds to the difference of the treated firm and its counterfactual situation, 
namely its unsubsidized twin. This provides the estimated treatment effect by 
firm, allowing estimating the policy-induced investment separately from the 
privately invested money on subsequent innovation performance. Furthermore, it 
allows taking the size of the subsidy into account. 
The Tobit model for 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖  can then be estimated as follows: 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙∗𝑖 = 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖, 𝜖𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)   (2.3.1) 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 = {
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙∗𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖 > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
   (2.3.2) 
where 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 is the non-negative observable innovation performance 
variable, capturing radical innovation at the firm level. 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖  corresponds to 
the latent dependent variable 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙∗𝑖 if latter is above zero and to zero 
otherwise. The model on the latent dependent variable, 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙∗𝑖 is estimated by 
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a parameter vector 𝛽, and a vector of firm characteristics 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1. The latter 
relationship is affected by a normally distributed error, to capture randomized 
firm influences. The model on incremental innovation is estimated analogously.  
In order for the estimates of a Tobit estimation to be consistent (see 
Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 680-687), homoscedasticity is required. Given that we 
found evidence for heteroscedasticity based on a Likelihood Ratio test, we 
estimate heteroscedastic robust Tobit models by maximum likelihood. Therefore, 
we replace the homoscedastic standard error term σ with σi = σexp(Z’α) in the 
likelihood function, modeling for group-wise multiplicative heteroscedasticity by 
including firm size and industry dummies. Accounting for the fact that our 
estimates for R&D investments (𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇, 𝑅&?̂?𝐶) are estimated values for the treated 
firms, ordinary standard errors would be biased. We thus correct our standard 
errors by conducting a bootstrapping procedure.8  
2.5 Data and model specification  
2.5.1 Data  
For the empirical analysis, the study uses a large-scale sample of Swiss firms 
derived from five waves (1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011) of the Swiss 
innovation survey, covering the years 1997-1999, 2000-2002, 2003-2005, 2006-
2008 and 2009-2011. The Swiss innovation survey is a postal survey conducted 
                                                 
8 We bootstrap the entire procedure (inclusive of the matching) 150 times, allowing us to 
estimate how the sample mean of our actual sample varies due to random sampling.  
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by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute at the ETH Zurich, and corresponds largely 
to the European Community Innovation Survey following the OECD guidelines 
(OECD, 1992). Our data set provides us with a representative sample, covering 
both manufacturing and service industries. The data set contains detailed 
information on firms’ R&D and innovation activities, performance measures, 
subsidy receipts and other firm characteristics. The response rates from the 
surveys are: 33.8% (1999), 39.6% (2002), 38.7% (2005), 36.1% (2008), and 
35.9% (2011). After eliminating missing values and limiting our sample to 
innovating firms only, we are left with 6084 observations from 3552 different 
firms, out of which 546 received a subsidy. 
2.5.2 Dependent variables  
Our analysis is separated into two main parts. For the treatment effects analysis, 
our outcome variable reflects the firms’ R&D investment, measured as the R&D 
expenditures to total turnover (RDINT). In the second part, following Meuer, 
Rupietta, and Backes-Gellner (2015), our outcome variables indicate radical 
innovation performance (RADICAL), measured as the sales share of radical 
innovative products and incremental innovation performance (INCREMENTAL), 
measured as the sales share of significantly improved products.9 
                                                 
9 We follow Meuer et al. (2015) for the definition of radical and incremental innovation. 
Using the same dataset as we use in our study, the authors define new products—to the 
market or the firm—as radical innovation and significantly improved products as 
incremental innovation.  
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2.5.3 Main explanatory variables  
The receipt of a subsidy is indicated by a dummy (PUBSUB) equal to one for 
subsidized firms and zero otherwise. Privately invested R&D expenditures and 
policy-induced expenditure are denoted by 𝑅&?̂?𝐶 and 𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇 respectively. 
As an important part of our setting is to analyze the role of R&D collaboration, 
we account for various collaboration partners. A dummy variable (RDCOOP) 
simply indicates if a firm is engaged in R&D collaboration. We then distinguish 
between vertical (CO_VERT), horizontal collaboration (CO_HOR), and 
collaboration with science (CO_SCIE).  
2.5.4 Other control variables  
We further control for a set of variables, which might influence the selection into 
public funding and/or drive innovation performance. 
                                                                                                                                     
   Other studies using this definition include for instance Ettlie, Bridges, and O'keefe 
(1984), who define radical innovation as being “new to the adopting unit and new to the 
referent group of organizations […] is sufficient to warrant the designation rare or radical, 
as opposed to incremental” (p.683). Garcia and Calantone (2002, p.122) stipulate that: “A 
failure to find discontinuity in technology and marketing strategies within a firm, should 
automatically exclude the product from being considered radical.” Hence, a technology 
new to the firm, introducing a discontinuity within the firm, should according to the 
typology of this paper be viewed as radical, while an improvement not causing a 
discontinuity at the firm level qualifies as incremental.   
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Having received a subsidy in the past might demonstrate existing competence 
and capabilities of the applicant and hence might influence the agency to select 
this firm again for a grant. We thus control for previous subsidies, where 
PAST_SUBSIDY equals one if a firm has received a subsidy in the past three 
years. Existing R&D capabilities may also be reflected in existing patents at the 
firm level. Indeed, patents may be a valid signal of previously successful R&D 
engagement. Consequently, we include a variable (PAT_EMPL) measuring 
successfully approved patents per 1,000 employees to avoid potential 
multicollinearity with firm size. We further control for firm age (FIRMAGE) and 
(the log of) firm size (LNFIRMSIZE), as these are important characteristics in the 
funding scheme of the agency. Additionally, we take a non-linear relationship into 
account and control for the squared term of the two previously mentioned 
variables (FIRMAGE2, LNFIRMSIZE2).  
Labor productivity might also influence the agency in the approval process, as 
it can be seen as an indicator for high firm competitiveness. We include the 
natural logarithm of the sales share per employee (LNLABPROD). As stated by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990), absorptive capacity is essential to integrate new 
knowledge. We therefore control for share of workforce with tertiary education in 
total employment (EMPACA). We further control for the fact that a firm belongs 
to a foreign group (FOREIGN). Subsidiaries with a foreign parent may be less 
likely to receive subsidies, because the parent may prefer to apply in its home 
country. Likewise, funding agencies may have a preference for local firms. 
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Furthermore, foreign parents with local subsidiaries are typically larger firms 
and may therefore not be the priority target of the funding agency, as SMEs 
generally constitute the main target group. It could, however, also be that firms 
belonging to a group may look attractive to a funding agency as the group 
membership possibly promises knowledge spillovers and thus economies of scope 
from the R&D process that go beyond national borders. It is thus unclear whether 
having a foreign parent plays favorably or not in receiving a subsidy from a Swiss 
funding agency. We take foreign market activities of a firm into account by 
controlling for its export activities. Highly export orientated firms might be more 
innovative, and hence more likely to apply for a subsidy. Export activities are 
measured by the export share to total turnover (EXPORT).  
In addition, we account for the level of general technological potential of a 
firm (TECHPOT) indicating the level of scientific and technological knowledge 
available to the firm for conducting innovation activities. TECHPOT is measured 
on a five point Likert-scale, where five indicates a high technological potential of 
the focal firm. Finally, five survey-year dummies and seven industry sector 
dummies complement our set of control variables. 
2.5.5 Timing of variables  
As mentioned above, each wave of the survey covers a three-year period. In order 
to avoid endogeneity between the dependent variables and the covariates to the 
largest extent, we employ lagged values wherever possible. For instance, suppose 
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the dependent variables are measured in period t. Then variables such for instance 
as employment or export are measured at period t-1.  
Information on variables that are assumed more stable over time, such are for 
instance being part of a group, are only available for the entire 3-year-period, i.e. 
t-2 to t. For instance, “Did your firm belong to a group during the period 2003-
2005?” We consider age as truly exogenous and hence it is measured in period t.10 
2.5.6 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in our analysis. Industry and 
size class distribution of our sample are displayed in Table 8 and 9 in Appendix 
2.8.1. As presented in Table 2, significant differences in the means of almost all 
variables between the subsidized firms and the non-subsidized firms exist. For 
instance, on average, subsidized firms are more likely to have experience in the 
past with subsidies, are slightly larger, have more approved patents per employee, 
have a higher likelihood belonging to a foreign group, have a higher educated 
workforce, are more export-oriented, have a higher technological potential, and 
engage more in R&D collaboration. Notably, they do not differ in firm age and 
labour productivity. With respect to the outcome variable, in alignment with our 
expectation, subsidized firms have on average higher R&D investments. 
However, at this point, we do not know how much of these additional R&D 
expenditures are induced by the subsidy or are due to other firm characteristics. 
                                                 
10 Refer to Arvanitis, Ley, Seliger, Stucki & Wörter (2013) for more information on the 
structure of the survey.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on innovating firms. 
 
 Unsubsidized firms,  
N = 5,538 
 Subsidized firms,  
N = 546 
 Results of t-
tests on mean 
differences 
Variables 
 
Mean Std.dev. 
 
Mean Std.dev.   
  
 
Covariates    
PAST_SUBSIDY  0.016 0.124  0.203 0.403 
 *** 
FIRMAGE  65.2 42.2  68.2 54.0 
  
FIRMAGE2  6034.9 10583.9  7562.7 21140.4 
 * 
LNFIRMSIZE  4.269 1.410  4.930 1.515 
 *** 
LNFIRMSIZE2  20.215 13.411  26.597 16.368 
 *** 
PAT_EMPL  12.904 143.565  31.965 90.542 
 *** 
LNLABPROD  12.509 0.752  12.505 0.650 
  
FOREIGN  0.158 0.365  0.200 0.400 
 ** 
EMPACA  5.760 11.413  11.875 16.974 
 *** 
EXPORT  25.498 34.307  51.031 38.591 
 *** 
RDCOOP  0.186 0.389  0.639 0.481 
 *** 
TECHPOT  2.788 1.144  3.484 0.977 
 *** 
    Outcome variable    
RDINT  1.400 3.894  5.747 13.606 
 *** 
 
2.6 Empirical analysis and discussion 
2.6.1 Average effect of public funding on subsidized firms  
As described above, we employ a matching estimation to identify the average 
treatment effect of public R&D grants on the treated firms. To be able to apply the 
matching estimator, we need to predict the probability of receiving public R&D 
funding. Therefore, we estimate a probit model on a subsidy receipt incorporating 
important characteristics for the selection into the funding scheme. As can be seen 
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in Table 3, with the exception of firm age, patents per employee, and being 
member of a foreign group, all our covariates are important drivers for the 
selection into the treatment.  
Table 4 presents the results of our econometric matching estimation. We can 
see that all our covariates are well balanced after the matching. This points to the 
fact that our matching was successful and that we found a close neighbor for each 
of our treated firms. The only variable that remains statistically significant is the 
outcome variable. We can thus attribute this difference to the treatment and can 
conclude that, in line with the literature, full crowding out can be rejected. 
Table 3: Probit estimation on the probability of receiving a subsidy.  
Variables Coefficient Standard errors 
PAST_SUBSIDY 1.149*** (0.100)  
FIRMAGE -0.001 (0.000)  
FIRMAGE2 0.000 (0.000)  
LNFIRMSIZE 0.142* (0.090)  
LNFIRMSIZE2 -0.004 (0.010)  
PAT_EMPL 0.000 (0.000)  
LNLABPROD -0.217*** (0.040)  
FOREIGN -0.082 (0.070)  
EMPACA 0.013*** (0.000)  
EXPORT 0.004*** (0.000)  
RDCOOP 0.770*** (0.060)  
TECHPOT 0.148*** (0.030)  
No. of observations 6084  
Log likelihood  -1392.4211  
Joint significance of industry dummies χ2(6) = 19.92***  
Joint significance of survey year dummies χ2(4) = 27.01***  
Note: The model includes a constant, industry and survey year dummies (not presented). 
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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In order to take a potential selection on unobservables into account, we test the 
robustness of our matching estimation by conducting an IV regression. The results 
of the IV regression as well as the choice of our IVs are presented in detail in 
Appendix 2.8.2 (Table 10). Conclusions remain unchanged even if we allow for a 
selection on unobservables.  
Table 4: Average treatment effect of public R&D funding. 
 
 
Selected control group, 
N=530  Subsidized firms, N=530  
p-value of t-tests 
on mean 
differences 
Variables 
 
Mean Std.dev. 
 
Mean Std.dev.   
  
 
Covariates    
PAST_SUBSIDY  0.145 0.353  0.179 0.384  0.195 
FIRMAGE  69.8 47.2  68.4 54.1  0.707 
FIRMAGE2  7097.0 11617.0  7605.1 21382.6  0.656 
LNFIRMSIZE  4.765 1.452  4.891 1.485  0.234 
LNFIRMSIZE2  24.815 14.577  26.120 15.855  0.228 
PAT_EMPL  20.623 54.565  28.963 79.044  0.072 
LNLABPROD  12.483 0.668  12.496 0.648  0.784 
FOREIGN  0.183 0.387  0.198 0.399  0.591 
EMPACA  12.578 19.054  11.259 16.303  0.311 
EXPORT  49.026 38.315  50.302 38.537  0.644 
RDCOOP  0.632 0.483  0.628 0.484  0.913 
TECHPOT  3.453 1.015  3.457 0.974  0.958 
   Outcome variable    
RDINT  3.453 5.859  5.698 13.717  0.001 
Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 16 observations are lost 
because of the common support condition. 
 
2.6.2 The impact on innovation performance 
In the following section, we turn to the analysis on innovation performance, as 
measured by the sales share of radically and incrementally new products 
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respectively. Before turning to the analysis, we provide some additional 
descriptive information on the variables that have not been used so far.  
More precisely, in Table 5 we show the distribution of radical and incremental 
innovation sales, as well as the distribution of policy induced and privately 
motivated R&D investment. We can see that the average sales share from 
radically new products is of 14.4% in our sample. Incremental innovations 
account for 16.7% of the total turnover of the firms in our sample. The average 
treatment effect amounts to 0.13%, while the private R&D investments 
corresponds to 1.86%. Furthermore, we see that even though the average 
treatment effect is positive, we have also some firms that experience a negative 
additionality. Specifically, as shown by Table 6, 43% of the treated firms have a 
negative alpha. In other words, for 43% of the firms, the R&D expenditures did 
not go up, but to the contrary, the firms spent less money on R&D even though 
they have received a subsidy. This can happen in case a project gets abandoned 
for instance, and all the related expenditures get cancelled as a consequence. 
While this may seem high, very similar results have been found for subsidized 
firms in Belgium, where 43,5% of subsidized firms experienced a negative 
additionality (see Hottenrott et al., 2014). Roughly 9% of the subsidized firms 
have an additionality of zero, meaning that they have spent exactly what they 
have received from the government, thereby not creating additional R&D 
expenditures in the economy. Finally, the lion’s share of the subsidized firms 
(46.5%) has a positive additionality, as one would expect by the way the policy is 
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constructed. In different words, these firms have respected to co-financing clause 
and have added private money to increase their overall R&D expenditures. 
Finally, 0.1% have an additionality above 50, which means that they invest over 
half of their turnover in R&D. While this may seem unlikely, it should be noted 
that it concerns only 5 firms, two of which are very small (6 employees and 9 
employees respectively). For such small firms, very high additionalities are not 
surprising.  
Table 5: Additional descriptive statistics.  
Variables Observations Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. 
RADICAL 4,862 14.406 18.139 0 100 
INCREMENTAL 4,862 16.706 19.654 0 100 
αi
TT 4,862 0.127 3.899 -52.134 100.0 
R&D̂C 4,862 1.862 4.218 0 55.6 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics on the output additionalities αi
TT, accounting for firm size 
and age.  
Percentages of firms  Firm Size  Firm Age 
N=477  S = 1–49 M = 50 – 249 L = 250-max.   <15 16-30 31-75 76-max. 
αi
TT < 0 43.40  15.94 51.69 32.37  6.28 10.63 41.55 41.55 
αi
TT = 0 9.01  23.26 34.88 41.86  9.30 23.26 27.91 39.53 
αi
TT > 0 46.54  29.52 43.17 27.31  4.85 22.91 39.65 32.60 
αi
TT > 50 1.05  40.00 - 60.00  - 20.00 60.00 20.00 
Note: It should be noted that the number of subsidized firms corresponds to the number of 
subsidized firms of the Tobit models, where we lose some observations because of missing 
values in the outcome variables.  
 
Table 7 displays the results of the heteroscedasticity-robust Tobit models on 
innovation outcome. Models one to five relate to the impact of both types of R&D 
investment on radical innovation, while models six to ten relate to incremental 
innovation. The various models per category take into account different 
collaboration patterns.  
Our baseline model for the impact on radical innovation (Model I), shows that 
both, policy-induced as well as privately invested R&D are positive and highly 
significant. Furthermore, we see that the coefficients are of a similar size. Put 
differently, a 10% increase in the counterfactual R&D investment would lead to a 
4,4 percentage point increase in the estimated latent dependent variable, i.e. the 
estimated sales share in radical innovation sales, on average, while a 10% increase 
in policy induced R&D investment would lead to a 3,7 percentage point increase 
in the estimated latent variable. Models two and three, containing a dummy for 
overall collaboration (Model II) and three dummies for vertical, horizontal and 
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collaboration with science (Model III) respectively, show that neither overall, nor 
a specific type of collaboration displays a significant effect on the estimated sales 
share in radical innovation. Policy-induced as well as privately motivated R&D 
investments stay positive and of the same magnitude.  
Next, to assess whether these effects change in light of the receipt of a subsidy, 
we interact privately as well as publicly induced R&D investment with different 
collaboration patterns. Model IV starts by interacting the overall collaboration 
dummy with both types of R&D investment. We see that neither one of the 
interaction terms is significant. In other words, the R&D investments driven by 
collaboration do not impact the estimated sales share of radical innovation. The 
same conclusion can be drawn for Model V, where we interact the three different 
types of collaboration with both types of R&D investment. We can thus conclude 
that collaborating, with science or another partner, does not improve the policy 
impact of the subsidy in terms of radical innovation sales.  
Turning to the impact on incremental innovation, we see that in line with our 
expectations, privately motivated R&D expenditures are significant. What strives 
our attention is the non-significant result of the publicly induced R&D 
investment, 𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇 (Model VI). While the coefficient is larger in magnitude than it is 
for radical innovation, it is not statistically significant. Even though the funding 
agency also supports incremental innovation projects, this finding points to the 
fact that the publicly induced part of the R&D investment mainly impacts radical 
innovation. 
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Going forward, we control for overall collaboration (Model VII) before 
differentiating between the types of external collaboration partners, namely 
horizontal, vertical and diagonal collaboration (Model VIII). As was the case for 
the radical innovation sales share, neither one of the collaboration dummies is 
significant, nor do they impact the results from the baseline model. When 
interacting both types of R&D investment with the collaboration dummy, we see 
that while the counterfactual R&D spending stays significant and positive, both 
privately and publicly invested parts of the investment that are interacted with 
collaboration are insignificant.  
Finally, in Model X we interact both types of R&D investment with the three 
different collaboration types. While collaboration with science overall displays a 
positive and significant impact in this case (as well as the counterfactual R&D 
spending), we see that parts of these positive impacts turn negative when driven 
by collaboration (CO_SCIE*𝑅&?̂?𝐶). Furthermore, when publicly induced R&D 
investment is driven by horizontal collaboration, the insignificant impacts of these 
variables turns negative and significant if interacted (CO_HOR*αi
TT).  
While the results of our models containing collaboration information may 
seem surprising, there may be several reasons able to explain such findings. For 
radical innovation, neither one of the collaboration installations have any impact 
on sales success, even though the funding agency encourages R&D collaboration 
between firms and especially between firms and science. One explanation for the 
insignificant results may be the fact that Switzerland is a relatively closed country, 
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where firms are not used to collaborate (as a matter of illustration, roughly 13% of 
the firms in Switzerland collaborate, compared to some 30% in Belgium for 
instance). Hence, firms may have developed the necessary skills and know-how 
over the years and are therefore less dependent on pooling resources with external 
partners. In this case, collaboration costs may indeed exceed gains in certain 
settings. In the case of Model X the fact that collaboration with science is negative 
may be explained by the fact that typically, collaboration with science is needed 
when firms intend undertaking path-breaking innovations, pushing the 
technological frontier. For incremental innovation, such type of collaboration is 
therefore not necessarily attractive, and may deviate resources from where they 
could have been invested more appropriately in terms of incremental change to 
existing products. Hence, if the strategy of the firm is to ensure long-term survival 
perspectives through incremental innovation, it seems that collaborating with 
science is not maximizing its partnership behavior. The negative impact of 
collaboration with competitors (horizontal collaboration) and its impact on the 
sales share of incremental innovation can be explained by the fact that 
incremental innovations are often times easier to imitate than radical innovations. 
Teaming up with a competitor may therefore mean losing parts of the market to 
that partner.     
In terms of policy effects in light of collaboration type, our results thus do not 
show any evidence that subsidized collaborating firms are more productive in 
terms of new products than non-subsidized firms. To the contrary, we even find 
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weak, yet negative results for the interaction of policy driven investment and 
horizontal and science collaboration. While the overall policy effect of the Swiss 
funding agency is positive, the encouragement of collaboration should be 
revisited.  
Before concluding, it should be noted that we took the potential endogeneity of 
our collaboration variables into account. In Appendix 2.8.3, we estimate a 
structural equation as introduced by Smith and Blundell (1986) to see if our 
results are driven by endogeneity. As shown by the results in Table 11 in 
Appendix 2.8.3, our findings are not driven by endogeneity. Furthermore, we 
allowed for a longer time lag as one may argue that the impact of both types of 
R&D investment or collaboration may need more time to impact radical than 
incremental innovations. As can be seen by Table 12 in Appendix 2.8.4, our 
conclusions remain unchanged if we allow for a longer time lag. Finally, we also 
re-estimated the main models controlling for other innovation expenditures. 
Indeed, one may argue that the way R&D translates into marketable products also 
depends on the expenditures done on top of R&D investment, independent of 
whether R&D was subsidized or not.11 We therefore control for innovation 
expenditures in the regressions of Table 13 in Appendix 2.8.5, to see if our 
                                                 
11 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
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findings hold for a given level of innovation investment.12 As can be seen from 
Table 13, our conclusions remain unchanged.  
It should be noted that due to the lower number of observations in the 
estimations with an additional time lag and in the estimations including other 
innovation investment, the significance levels drop slightly, as the lower number 
of observations induces larger standard errors.13  
                                                 
12 Innovation expenditures include R&D expenditures, but also other expenditures needed 
in the innovation process, such as expenditures for construction and design, further 
follow-up investments, including acquisition of other external knowledge, acquisition of 
specific machinery or software needed for the development or finalization of 
technologies, as well as expenditures related to the certification of products or packaging 
technology. Innovation investment enters the equation net of R&D expenditures to avoid 
double counting.  
13 The missing observations in the models with additional time lags are due to the 
unbalanced nature of our panel. The missing values in the estimation containing net 
innovation investment is due the missing values in this variable.  
  
Table 7: Heteroscedasticity-robust Tobit estimates on radical and incremental innovation performance. 
   RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X 
αi
TT  0.371** 0.370** 0.366** 0.203 0.237  0.522 0.521 0.526 0.214 0.289 
                                (0.153) (0.154) (0.153) (0.377) (0.356)  (0.349) (0.352) (0.361) (0.395) (0.383) 
R&D̂C   0.444*** 0.437*** 0.428*** 0.512*** 0.548***  0.364** 0.352** 0.332** 0.782*** 0.770*** 
                                (0.119) (0.117) (0.121) (0.158) (0.158)  (0.148) (0.144) (0.146) (0.235) (0.207) 
RDCOOP                        0.416             0.540               0.735             2.126**             
                                 (0.909)             (0.927)               (1.029)             (0.979)             
FIRMAGE                        -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.063***  -0.120** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.118*** 
                                (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) 
FIRMAGE2                       0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
                                (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE                      0.889 0.884 0.934 0.936 1.018  -0.924 -0.930 -0.739 -0.940 -0.627 
                                (0.917) (0.919) (0.916) (0.945) (0.969)  (1.172) (1.171) (1.147) (1.170) (1.121) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                     -0.095 -0.096 -0.104 -0.101 -0.111  0.117 0.114 0.087 0.116 0.081 
                                (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.094) (0.098)  (0.115) (0.115) (0.111) (0.115) (0.108) 
EXPORT                        0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052***  0.043*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 
                                (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
TECHPOT                        1.399*** 1.373*** 1.336*** 1.356*** 1.276**  2.151*** 2.109*** 2.006*** 2.021*** 1.838*** 
                                (0.436) (0.422) (0.456) (0.434) (0.501)  (0.389) (0.381) (0.390) (0.394) (0.429) 
continued             
 
  
  
continued  RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X 
CO_VERT                                      -0.542  -1.534               0.329  -1.172 
                                             (1.763)  (1.874)               (1.157)  (1.341) 
CO_HOR                                       0.227  0.074               3.334  4.707 
                                             (1.480)  (2.231)               (3.220)  (3.903) 
CO_SCIE                                      1.392  3.115               0.257  3.396* 
                                             (2.078)  (2.926)               (2.276)  (1.900) 
RDCOOP*𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇                           0.386                                       0.663             
                                                         (0.673)                                       (0.638)             
RDCOOP *𝑅&?̂?𝐶                             -0.101                                       -0.678             
                                                         (0.215)                                       (0.416)             
CO_VERT*𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇                            0.322                                       0.683 
                                                          (0.670)                                       (0.800) 
CO_VERT*𝑅&?̂?𝐶                              0.383                                       0.431 
                                                          (0.276)                                       (0.267) 
CO_HOR*𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇                            0.381                                       -0.847* 
                                                          (0.489)                                       (0.507) 
CO_HOR*𝑅&?̂?𝐶                              0.077                                       -0.362 
                                                          (0.424)                                       (0.312) 
CO_SCIE*𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇                            -0.073                                       0.135 
                                                          (0.607)                                       (0.740) 
CO_SCIE*𝑅&?̂?𝐶                              -0.644                                       -1.103*** 
                                                                     (0.434)                                       (0.406) 
No. of observations  4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862  4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses are clustered at the firm level and bootstrapped with 150 replications. Time and industry dummies are jointly 
significant (not presented). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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2.7 Conclusion 
Our study is an extension of previous studies interested in the effects of public 
R&D polices on input and/or output additionality. We contribute to current 
knowledge on the effect of such policy by providing evidence as to where the 
policy impact is highest, radical or incremental innovation. Furthermore, we take 
specific collaboration patterns into account to see whether these impacts are 
affected by R&D collaboration as well as the type thereof (i.e. horizontal, vertical 
or with science).  
In terms of input additionality, we find, in line with previous studies, evidence 
that allows rejecting the null hypothesis of full crowding out. Taking into account 
the degree of novelty in terms of innovation performance, this analysis fills a gap 
by providing evidence on the fact that the impact of the Swiss funding agency is 
higher for radical than for incremental innovation, as there is no significant impact 
for the latter in terms of policy induced R&D expenditures. In line with our 
expectations, privately invested R&D expenditures are positive and significant for 
both types of innovation output.  
 Given that the Swiss funding policy encourages firms to collaborate in their 
R&D activities, our work integrates information on firms’ collaboration status. 
Compared to previous studies that only consider whether or not a firm qualifies as 
collaborator, we additionally account for specific types of collaboration partners. 
We are thus able to investigate the effects of different collaboration constellations, 
i.e. horizontal, vertical and collaboration with science in our framework. While 
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the fact of collaborating as such does not impact the sales share of either 
incremental or radical innovation, we find that when collaboration types are 
interacted with R&D investment, parts of the investment driven by collaboration 
(horizontal and science) turns negative in the case of incremental innovation. 
Hence, the policy effect is not enhanced by a specific collaboration strategy and 
collaborative R&D should not necessarily constitute a priority for the Swiss 
funding agency.    
Combing strategic management literature on radical vs. incremental innovation 
and on collaboration impacts with literature on policy evaluation, our study also 
allows drawing implications from a managerial perspective. From a managerial 
point of view, the findings are relevant from mainly two angles. In terms of 
subsidy strategy, it is vital for a manager to know that it is more likely for a 
subsidy to have the desired impact when used for more radical innovation 
projects. From a collaboration strategy perspective, it is important to know that 
there are also downsides to engaging into collaboration. Hence, if tempted to 
engage in R&D collaborations in order to increase the probability of receiving a 
subsidy, managers should be aware that there may also be downsides to this 
strategy, and that the impact of the subsidy may even turn negative in light of 
collaboration. 
Despite all efforts, our analysis is not without limitation. One improvement 
would be to have access to panel data, allowing following firms over time, 
thereby being able to analyze the impact of a subsidy in a before-after setting. 
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Furthermore, having information about the rejected applicants would have 
allowed for a series of additional robustness checks to strengthen our findings. 
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2.8 Appendices  
2.8.1 Appendix: Additional descriptive statistics 
Table 8: Industry distribution. 
Industry Number of firms Percentages   
Percentage of 
subsidized firms 
per sector 
1 Construction, mining, energy 441 7.25  5.90 
2 Consumer goods (food, beverages, tobacco, 
textiles, clothing) 433 7.12 
 
9.01 
3 Intermediate goods (paper, printing, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastics, minerals, basic 
metals) 1,051 17.27 
 
9.13 
4 Investment goods (fabricated metals, machinery 
& equipment, electrical equipment, electronics 
and optical products, medical instruments, 
watches, vehicles, and other manufacturing) 2,111 34.7 
 
13.55 
5 Traditional services (trade, transportation, 
telecommunications) 923 15.17 
 
4.55 
6 Knowledge-based services (banking, insurance, 
information technology & services, technical 
commercial services)  874 14.37 
 
5.72 
7 Other services 251 4.13  2.79 
Total 
6,084 100  8.97 (on average) 
 
Table 9: Size class distribution. 
Size class Size class distribution Number of firms Percentages  
Percentage of 
subsidized firms 
per size class 
1 Small-sized firms 1 – 49 2,489 40.91  5.10 
2 Medium-sized 50 – 249 2,405 39.53  10.27 
3 Large-sized 250 – max. 1,190  19.56  14.45 
 Total 6,084 100  8.97 (on average) 
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2.8.2 Appendix: Robustness check for the matching estimation accounting for 
potential selection on unobservables 
An essential assumption to conduct a valid matching estimation is the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA). Indeed, for the matching estimation to be valid, 
the outcome has to be statistically independent of program participation, 
conditional on a series of observable characteristics. This fundamental assumption 
is however not testable. Therefore, we test the robustness of our matching 
estimation results by taking into account the selection on observables. We do so 
using an instrumental variables (IV) approach.  
To conduct our IV regression, we employ two instruments for the subsidy 
receipt. First, we use the likelihood of receiving a subsidy by region and industry 
(IV_1); and second, we use the likelihood of collaborating with science by 
industry (IV_2).  
IV_1 is justified by the fact that funding agencies often have preferences in 
terms of location or industries. Even though such priorities are not formal 
conditions, it may very well be that a firm based in direct proximity of a funding 
agency is more aware of the policy and is more visible to the decision makers than 
a firm that is situated further away. Hence, being part of a region or an industry 
where the likelihood of receiving a subsidy is high, is likely to impact the receipt 
of a subsidy of firm i. The rationale of using the industry average of collaboration 
with science institutions as an instrument (IV_2) documents the fact that some 
technological trajectories have closer relationships to universities and other 
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research centers. Having a closer relationship to science collaboration increases 
the likelihood of being retained for funding, given that the Swiss government aims 
at increasing industry – science links.  
Both instruments fulfill the statistical tests for being valid instruments. In the 
first stage, both IVs are highly significant. In the second stage, the Hansen J-test 
of overidentification is insignificant. Hence, both from a statistical as well as from 
an economic point of view, our instruments are valid. As displayed in Table 10, 
the results of the IV estimation are in line with what we find in our matching 
estimation.   
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Table 10: Robustness test with instrumental variables for subsidies on R&D intensity. 
  First stage Probit:   Second stage Tobit: 
Variables RDCOOP  RADICAL INCREMENTAL 
IND_COOP (IV_1)                     -0.560*    
                               (0.307)    
COOP_EXP (IV_2)                1.146***    
                               (0.047)    
RDINT                          0.011  0.446*** 0.387*** 
                               (0.007)  (0.068) (0.081) 
FIRMAGE                        -0.001  -0.061*** -0.080*** 
                               (0.001)  (0.014) (0.017) 
FIRMAGE2                       0.000  0.000*** 0.000*** 
                               (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE                     0.01  0.865 -1.235 
                               (0.072)  (1.083) (1.269) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                    -0.003  -0.08 0.124 
                               (0.007)  (0.109) (0.129) 
EXPORT                       0.001  0.031*** 0.043*** 
                               (0.001)  (0.011) (0.012) 
TECHPOT                        0.096***  1.652*** 2.278*** 
                               (0.027)  (0.310) (0.361) 
RDCOOP                                    1.283 0.12 
                                            (1.210) (1.398) 
1ST STAGE RESIDUALS               -0.026 0.248 
                                            (0.172) (0.198) 
No. of observations 4,224  4,224 4,224 
Note: IV_1 represents the industry mean of collaborating firms in previous years. IV_2 
reflects the firm’s overall collaboration experience. The second stage Tobit models employ 
heteroscedastic-robust estimations. All stages include an intercept, time and industry 
dummies (not presented). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. 
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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2.8.3 Appendix: Robustness check for potential endogeneity of the collaboration 
variable in the innovation outcome equation  
In our innovation outcome estimations, we face the problem that one of our main 
explanatory variable might be endogenous, namely our collaboration variables. In 
order to test if our results are affected by potential endogeneity, we conduct a 
structural equation approach introduced by Smith and Blundell (1986). For the 
sake of this robustness check, we defined two instrumental variables for our 
potential endogenous collaboration variable RDCOOP following the advices of 
Murray (2006). Our first instrumental variable IND_COOP (IV_1) captures the 
share of collaborating firms by industry (at nace-2-level) in previous years. The 
rationale behind this instrument is that the higher the share of collaborating firms 
in a given industry, the higher is the probability that a firm i in industry j engages 
in collaboration in a given period. Our second instrumental variable COOP_EXP 
(IV_2) is defined as the overall collaboration experience of a firm i in our sample, 
and takes values from 0 to 5. The more experience a firm has in collaboration, the 
higher the likelihood of this firm to engage in collaboration again.  
To further test the statistical validity of our instruments employed for the 
Blundell-Smith test of exogeneity, we ran a couple of tests on the validity of the 
chosen instruments. It should be noted though that we have to use the standard 
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach, as standard tests of over-identification 
do not exist for the Blundell-Smith approach. Our two excluded instruments are 
jointly statistical significant at the 1%-level (F(2, 2722) = 647.97), and the Hansen 
Radical or incremental: Where does R&D policy hit?  
 
 
55 
J test of over-identification cannot be rejected for radical innovation performance 
(Hansen J statistic = 2.540, p=.111), nor for incremental innovation performance 
(Hansen J statistic = 2.578, p=.108). Finally, both our instruments are statistically 
significant in the first stage of the equation. Considering the above results, we can 
conclude that our two instrumental variables satisfy the statistical requirements. 
As can be see seen in Table 11, the first stage residuals are not significant in 
the innovation outcome equations. Therefore, we can conclude that our findings 
are not driven by endogeneity.  
  
Radical or incremental: Where does R&D policy hit?  
 
 
56 
Table 11: Robustness test with instrumental variables for R&D collaboration on 
innovation outcome.  
  First stage Probit:   Second stage Tobit: 
Variables RDCOOP  RADICAL INCREMENTAL 
IND_COOP (IV_1)                     -0.560*    
                               (0.307)    
COOP_EXP (IV_2)                1.146***    
                               (0.047)    
RDINT                          0.011  0.446*** 0.387*** 
                               (0.007)  (0.068) (0.081) 
FIRMAGE                        -0.001  -0.061*** -0.080*** 
                               (0.001)  (0.014) (0.017) 
FIRMAGE2                       0.000  0.000*** 0.000*** 
                               (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE                     0.01  0.865 -1.235 
                               (0.072)  (1.083) (1.269) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                    -0.003  -0.08 0.124 
                               (0.007)  (0.109) (0.129) 
EXPORT                       0.001  0.031*** 0.043*** 
                               (0.001)  (0.011) (0.012) 
TECHPOT                        0.096***  1.652*** 2.278*** 
                               (0.027)  (0.310) (0.361) 
RDCOOP                                    1.283 0.12 
                                            (1.210) (1.398) 
1ST STAGE RESIDUALS               -0.026 0.248 
                                            (0.172) (0.198) 
No. of observations 4,224  4,224 4,224 
Note: IV_1 represents the industry mean of collaborating firms in previous years. IV_2 
reflects the firm’s overall collaboration experience. The second stage Tobit models employ 
heteroscedastic-robust estimations. All stages include an intercept, time and industry 
dummies (not presented). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. 
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
 
  
2.8.4 Appendix:  Using a different time structure 
Table 12: Robustness check controlling for additional time lags (including a survey-time-lag, corresponding to a 4-year-time-lag). 
Heteroscedasticity-robust Tobit estimates on radical and incremental innovation performance.  
   RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
Lagged variables  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X 
αi
TT  0.809* 0.802* 0.808* 0.837 0.844  0.114 0.106 0.113 0.031 0.034 
                                (0.441) (0.451) (0.449) (0.631) (0.570)  (0.466) (0.460) (0.464) (0.837) (0.743) 
R&D̂C   0.844*** 0.811*** 0.835*** 0.809*** 0.813***  0.875*** 0.859*** 0.863*** 0.874*** 0.873*** 
                                (0.165) (0.164) (0.169) (0.279) (0.307)  (0.215) (0.227) (0.222) (0.318) (0.311) 
RDCOOP                        4.238***             4.411***               1.800  1.664             
                                 (1.399)             (1.214)               (1.899)  (2.397)             
FIRMAGE                        -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018  -0.026 -0.027 -0.025 -0.026 -0.025 
                                (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)  (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
FIRMAGE2                       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                                (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE                      4.045** 4.214** 4.408*** 4.110** 4.165***  -0.259 -0.172 -0.125 -0.005 0.036 
                                (1.787) (1.725) (1.693) (1.674) (1.618)  (2.292) (2.268) (2.307) (2.254) (2.244) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                     -0.155 -0.193 -0.214 -0.185 -0.192  0.249 0.233 0.224 0.219 0.213 
                                (0.200) (0.187) (0.180) (0.179) (0.168)  (0.243) (0.242) (0.243) (0.240) (0.235) 
EXPORT                        0.042** 0.033 0.038* 0.034 0.038*  0.079*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 
                                (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
TECHPOT                        1.437*** 1.255** 1.214** 1.250** 1.205**  1.922*** 1.856*** 1.835*** 1.858*** 1.810*** 
                                (0.492) (0.496) (0.490) (0.499) (0.508)  (0.553) (0.538) (0.539) (0.538) (0.536) 
continued             
 
  
  
 
continued  RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X 
CO_VERT                                      2.193  0.752               2.451  1.947 
                                             (1.628)  (1.955)               (2.788)  (3.730) 
CO_HOR                                       5.955**  5.449               2.208  1.543 
                                             (2.961)  (3.967)               (2.220)  (2.785) 
CO_SCIE                                      -0.666  1.313               -1.448  -0.851 
                                             (2.032)  (3.006)               (2.389)  (2.914) 
RDCOOP*𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇                           -0.242                                       0.420             
                                                         (0.671)                                       (0.865)             
RDCOOP *𝑅&?̂?𝐶                             -0.033                                       0.004             
                                                         (0.436)                                       (0.459)             
CO_VERT*𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇                            0.410                                       0.381 
                                                          (1.094)                                       (1.217) 
CO_VERT*𝑅&?̂?𝐶                              0.556                                       0.271 
                                                          (0.445)                                       (0.670) 
CO_HOR*𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇                            0.575                                       -0.249 
                                                          (0.753)                                       (1.010) 
CO_HOR*𝑅&?̂?𝐶                              0.173                                       0.262 
                                                          (0.515)                                       (0.539) 
CO_SCIE*𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑇                            -0.780                                       0.312 
                                                          (1.097)                                       (1.347) 
CO_SCIE*𝑅&?̂?𝐶                              -0.643                                       -0.326 
                                                                     (0.704)                                       (0.594) 
No. of observations  1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924  1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses are clustered at the firm level and bootstrapped with 150 replications. Time and industry dummies are jointly significant (not presented). 
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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2.8.5 Appendix: Accounting for other innovation investments 
Table 13: Robustness check: Heteroscedastic-robust Tobit estimates on radical and 
incremental innovation performance, holding other innovation investments constant. 
   RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III  Model VI Model VII Model VIII 
αi
TT  0.416* 0.417* 0.418*  0.598 0.599 0.603 
                                (0.250) (0.254) (0.251)  (0.381) (0.386) (0.397) 
R&D̂C   0.528*** 0.518*** 0.539***  0.749*** 0.715*** 0.689*** 
                                (0.147) (0.152) (0.155)  (0.244) (0.235) (0.232) 
INNO_INV  0.303*** 0.303*** 0.301***  -0.282 -0.281 -0.283 
  (0.091) (0.091) (0.092)  (0.257) (0.255) (0.257) 
RDCOOP                         0.464    1.750*  
                                 (1.206)    (1.054)  
CO_VERT                                      2.136*    -0.085 
                                             (1.267)    (1.618) 
CO_HOR                                       -2.046    2.384 
                                             (2.824)    (2.247) 
CO_SCIE                                      -1.994    2.669 
                                             (1.623)    (1.647) 
FIRMAGE                         -0.127** -0.127** -0.129**  -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.095*** 
                                (0.054) (0.055) (0.056)  (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
FIRMAGE2                        0.000* 0.000* 0.000*  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
                                (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE                      1.446 1.438 1.352  3.604 3.592 3.657 
                                (1.198) (1.189) (1.169)  (2.318) (2.287) (2.257) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                     -0.122 -0.123 -0.110  -0.310 -0.314 -0.329 
                                (0.115) (0.113) (0.111)  (0.217) (0.214) (0.211) 
EXPORT                        0.054** 0.053** 0.053**  0.019 0.016 0.015 
                                (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
TECHPOT                         1.257** 1.235** 1.320***  2.255*** 2.172*** 2.060*** 
                                (0.527) (0.498) (0.462)  (0.459) (0.454) (0.443) 
No. of observations   3,477 3,477 3,477  3,477 3,477 3,477 
Note: Bootstrapped standard deviations in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. Time 
and industry dummies are jointly significant (not presented). *** (**, *) indicate a 
significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Cooperating with external partners: The importance of diversity 
for innovation performance 
 
A version of this chapter has been published in European J. International 
Management, reproduced by permission from Inderscience Publishers: 
Beck, M. and Schenker-Wicki, A. (2014) ‘Cooperating with external partners: the 
importance of diversity for innovation performance’, European J. International 
Management,  Vol. 8, No. 5, pp.548–569.  
 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates how diversity in R&D cooperation networks 
affects firms' innovation performance output as measured by each firm’s sales 
share of innovative products. To address this question, the authors analyze a 
large-scale sample of microdata on Swiss firms from five waves (1999, 2002, 
2005, 2008 and 2011) of the Swiss innovation survey using panel data analysis. 
The findings suggest that firms with greater diversity in their cooperation network 
benefit by generating new product innovations, and that the diversity benefit is 
greatest for small firms. The study further detects a curvilinear relationship 
between diversity of collaborator types and innovation performance, and 
emphasizes the importance of appropriate HRM and knowledge management 
policies and practices in providing firms with an effective mechanism for 
maximizing the benefits from diversified cooperation networks. 
 Keywords: Collaboration for innovation; cooperation; strategic alliances; 
diversity; innovation performance; human resource management policies and 
practices; knowledge management; absorptive capacity; small firms. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This paper focuses on firms’ openness in cooperation networks with external 
partners and analyzes how diversity in types of collaboration partners influences 
firms’ innovation performance. In highly industrialized countries, firms need to be 
innovative to compete in their markets. For many enterprises, the generation and 
successful market introduction of new innovative products are crucially important 
for securing future business. However, becoming and remaining innovative are 
difficult, especially in technological and market environments characterized by 
high knowledge intensity and uncertainty (Teece, 1986). Sources of knowledge 
and competences—necessary for creating new products and processes—are 
dispersed widely and difficult to locate. Additionally, since the 1980s, 
globalization has led to a more competitive and dynamic environment while 
product and technology life cycles have become shorter. Both effects have 
challenged firms to redefine their innovation search strategies and widen their 
technological bases (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). 
Given these circumstances, firms need to develop new knowledge-
appropriating architectures or, as Teece (1992, p. 22) argues, “successful 
technological innovation requires complex forms of business organization.” 
Contrary to the Schumpeter’s lonely entrepreneur, today’s firms’ innovations are 
rarely generated in isolation. Instead, innovating firms have begun to search for 
partners, and increasingly build their innovation activities on external knowledge 
sources, that complement their own capabilities (Al-Laham, Amburgey, & Baden-
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Fuller, 2010; Colombo, Laursen, Magnusson, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2011; Grimpe & 
Kaiser, 2010; Henttonen & Ritala, 2013; Katila, 2002). Thus, firms interact with 
their external environment to gain access and to acquire new ideas for future 
innovations (Caloghirou et al., 2003).  
In this context, cooperation and other means of collaboration among partners 
provide firms with an attractive means of organizing innovative activities (Doz, 
Santos, & Williamson, 2001). This study takes a resource-based approach 
(Penrose, 1959; Tsang, 2000) and contributes to the discussions on how diversity 
of partner types in collaborative networks influences firm innovation performance 
and how this relationship is affected by firm size and internal absorptive capacity. 
The construct of innovation performance can be linked to Schumpeter’s 
classification of innovation as the successful introduction of new products, new 
production processes, new means and sources of supply, new exploitation of 
markets, and new ways to organize business (Schumpeter, 1912). This study 
focuses on innovation output and considers only product innovations, measured 
here by the sale shares of new or significantly improved products in total 
turnover.  
In our empirical work, we refer to cooperation activities as formal agreements 
with external partners such as other firms, suppliers, customers or research 
institutions on joint research and development (R&D) activities. Collaboration 
can facilitate access to complementary assets, create opportunities to exploit 
synergies (Becker & Dietz, 2004; Bercovitz & Feldman, 2007; Dachs, 
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Ebersberger, & Pyka, 2008), and initiate intensive learning processes (Soo, 
Devinney, & Midgley, 2007). 
Some scholars argue that, with the establishment of cooperation activities in 
the innovation process, the firms’ perspective for generating innovations has 
changed from an internal and isolationist type to a more open model of 
innovation, that includes inter-firm R&D collaborations (Chesbrough, 2003a; 
Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006; Huizingh, 2011; Lichtenthaler, 2008), 
mass customization and personalization (Tseng & Piller, 2003), and external 
sourcing of knowledge (Laursen & Salter, 2006). 
Various empirical studies have addressed the effects of different open search 
strategies for firms’ innovation outcomes (Henttonen, Ritala, & Jauhiainen, 2011; 
Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Sofka & Grimpe, 2010). Most of these studies (e.g., 
Chiang & Hung, 2010; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010) build on the concept of external 
search depth and external search breadth, initiated by Laursen & Saulter (2006), 
who differentiate between the intensity of the use of external knowledge sources 
(depth) and the number of external sources used (breath). The results of these 
studies indicate that the use of both search strategies—specialized (depth) and 
more inclusive (breath)—are important factors for innovation outcomes. 
However, there is still a lack of understanding about the specific effects of 
different search strategies for innovation performance. More precisely, little is 
known about the effects of focused versus diversified cooperation strategies and 
about the potential implications of an over-diversified cooperation strategy in a 
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firm’s external partner network. In this area, more empirical studies are needed to 
determine the practical implications for firms and policy makers in the 
formulation of appropriate technology policies. 
More insight into this relationship would also allow initiating appropriate 
knowledge management and human resource management (HRM) policies and 
practices. Management scholars have already recognized the relevance of HRM 
and knowledge management for fostering innovation activities and creating an 
innovative culture inside the firm (Cabello-Medina, Lopez-Cabrales, & Valle-
Cabrera, 2011; Jimenez-Jimenez & Sanz-Valle, 2005; Laursen & Foss, 2003; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Schuler & Jackson, 1987; Wozniak, 1987). In this 
regard, HRM has launched various initiatives in the areas of (global) talent 
management, compensation and reward management, recruitment and selection, 
job design and work arrangements, performance management, and training and 
development; and it has further worked to build competences in corporate 
leadership (Aguirre, Post, & Hewlett, 2009; Kesting, Mueller, Jorgensen, & 
Ulhoi, 2011; Schuler & Jackson, 2007). These HRM approaches have mainly 
focused on promoting and facilitating innovation activities within firms. Less 
attention has been paid to how HRM and knowledge management can contribute 
to better integration of external knowledge, capabilities, and technology located 
outside the firm, or better management of the firm’s external cooperation network. 
This is especially valid in the early stages of innovation— including idea creation 
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and idea conversion—with partners outside the firm (Jaruzelski, Loehr, & 
Holman, 2012). 
In order to gather more empirical evidence for the aforementioned open 
questions, this work extends the existing literature by conceptualizing the 
relationship between the diversity of cooperation partner types in collaborative 
networks and firm innovation output performance. The goal of this work is to 
examine the potential for the decreasing returns of an over-diversified cooperation 
network, taking into account firm size and internal absorptive capacity. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study using a large-scale 
representative panel data structure with cross-sectional firm-level data from 
manufacturing and service industries, which identifies a curvilinear relationship 
between cooperation partner type diversity and firm innovation performance. The 
analysis uses data from five waves (1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011) of the 
Swiss innovation survey and employs a Tobit panel data regression method.  
The paper is structured into five sections as follows. The next section 
introduces key underlying theoretical arguments, presents previous literature, and 
formulates the main hypotheses for empirical analysis. Section three presents the 
data and the methodological approach. Results are discussed in section four. 
Finally, section five concludes and gives an outlook for future research. 
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3.2 Overview of the theoretical background and previous studies 
In the following section, the relationship between cooperation activities in the 
innovation process and subsequent firm innovation performance is elaborated 
from a theoretical and empirical perspective. 
3.2.1 Key theoretical arguments  
From a theoretical perspective, three main streams of literature deal with the 
effect of inter-firm collaboration on the innovation process. The first branch of 
literature falls into the “neoclassical” field of mainstream industrial organization 
(D'Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988; Dasgupta & Stiglitz, 1980; Martin, 1994; 
Martin, 2002; Spence, 1984) and transaction cost economics (Jaffe, 1996; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985). The second stream incorporates strategic management 
approaches to inter-firm arrangements (Coombs, 1996; Hagedoorn, 2002; 
Nooteboom, 1999). Here, the emphasis is on improving the firm’s competitive 
position (Hagedoorn, 1993; Porter, 1980, 1990), exploration of complementary 
external resources and capabilities (Richardson, 1972; Teece, 1982, 1986, 1992), 
and creation and acquisition of new knowledge and technology (Dodgson, 1991; 
Granstrand, Oskarsson, Sjoberg, & Sjolander, 1990; Pavitt, 1988).14 As reported 
by management literature (Hagedoorn, Link, & Vonortas, 2000; Rosenfeld, 1996), 
large multinational companies as well as small- and medium-sized firms have 
                                                 
14 Caloghirou et al. (2003) provide a detailed overview of theoretical perspectives 
regarding transaction cost economics, industrial organization, and (strategic) management 
literature. 
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built up more and closer relationships with other companies since the mid-1990s. 
These formal or informal joint activities enable firms to gain market access, avoid 
duplicative research and benefit from synergies due to learning and economies of 
scale and scope (van de Vrande, de Jong, Vanhaverbeke, & de Rochemont, 2009; 
Zeng, Xie, & Tam, 2010).  
According to transaction cost theorists, cooperation can be seen as an efficient 
hybrid coordination mechanism between markets and internal organization that 
reduces transaction costs. While markets—and therefore prices—are expected to 
allocate resources in an efficient way to generate optimal outcomes, there are 
considerable doubts that prices are adequate signals in a technological 
environment characterized by high uncertainty (Teece, 1992). Williamson (1975) 
argues that market imperfections arise not only from the difficulty of finding 
relevant information on prices and quality (Coase, 1937), but also from the 
difficulty of managing economic activities with incomplete contracts. Full 
integration also has its weaknesses: one example is the provision of appropriate 
incentives and compensation. Full integration of R&D can also narrow the view 
of workers on changes in technology (Dosi, 1997). Therefore, from a transaction 
cost perspective, cooperation may reduce transaction costs through improved 
flexibility and rapid adjustment to industrial changes and demand (Das, Sen, & 
Sengupta, 1998). 
Another perspective on firms’ decisions whether or not to cooperate is the 
trade-off between incoming and outgoing flows of knowledge. A firm should aim 
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to maximize incoming spillovers while minimizing outgoing spillovers. Firms 
with more effective and efficient R&D, have what is known as higher internal 
capacity of the firm (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002), and are more able to take 
advantage of external sources of knowledge. This is related to the concept of 
“absorptive capacity” established by Cohen & Levinthal (1989, 1990), who argue 
that such capacity is crucial for benefitting from externally generated knowledge.  
The third main stream—evolutionary economics—emphasizes the importance 
of openness in the innovative opportunity search strategy of the firm. Through its 
access to external technological sources, a firm is able to choose among a greater 
variety of technological opportunities (Metcalfe, 1994). This provides the firm 
with the possibility of creating or combining new technologies and knowledge, 
thereby increasing the probability it will become a successful innovator (Levinthal 
& March, 1993; Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, it may be difficult to combine 
many types of knowledge, and the possibility of gaining benefits from external 
sources is related to industry technology characteristics, particularly inherent 
technological opportunities (Klevorick, Levin, Nelson, & Winter, 1995). 
3.2.2 Cooperation and innovative activities  
When considering the increasing importance of cooperative activities in the 
innovation process (Hippel, 1988), most previous studies focus on determinants 
and motives for cooperative behavior with different partners (Fritsch & Lukas, 
2001; Kaiser, 2002; Miotti & Sachwald, 2003; Tether, 2002). As a result, the 
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effect of cooperative behavior on the input and output of innovation performance 
(Belderbos et al., 2004a) still remains under-examined and requires further 
research (Lichtenthaler, 2011). Firms engaged in formal collaborative research 
generally have higher R&D expenditures (Becker & Dietz, 2004) and higher 
R&D profits (Belderbos et al., 2004a). With respect to innovation input 
performance, collaborating firms seek to increase resources and capabilities by 
combining their resources and utilizing complementarities (Gulati, 1995; Kogut, 
1988). 
3.2.3 Types of cooperation partners and innovation performance  
The choice to cooperate with a certain type of partner is a trade-off of expected 
gains against expected risks (Katila et al., 2008; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 
1996). Different types of partners have specific characteristics affecting how 
cooperation is managed (Whitley, 2002).  
In recent studies analyzing the relationship between cooperation partner type 
and innovation performance in terms of increased product or process innovations, 
no clear-cut results can be found, but some tendencies can be discerned. 
Cooperation with clients benefits firms in the improvement of product innovations 
by improving market information (Fritsch & Lukas, 2001) directly involving 
R&D teams (Atuahene-Gima, 1995). Cooperation with suppliers can reduce lead-
time and risks while increasing flexibility, product quality, and market 
adaptability (Chung & Kim, 2003). Cooperation activities with competitors entails 
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the “hold-up” problem, which means that cooperation is more beneficial for both 
parties if common problems and/or activities are beyond the competitor’s sphere 
of influence (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Tether, 2002).15 
Cooperation with research organizations provides access to scientific and 
technological knowledge (Drejer & Jorgensen, 2005; Lundvall, 1992), and plays 
an important role in both technological innovations (Bozeman, 2000; Vuola & 
Hameri, 2006) and the opening of new markets (Belderbos et al., 2004a). 
Diversity of cooperation partners affects firms’ innovation activities. 
Evolutionary economists point out that a wide range of external partners and 
sources is crucial for increasing the variety of knowledge within the firm (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982). Further, such variety generates opportunities to innovate 
through the creation of new knowledge and technology combinations 
(Chesbrough, 2003b; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Laursen & Salter (2006) argue that 
different strategies for using different search channels— suppliers, users, other 
firms, universities, and other research institutions—are important in explaining 
heterogeneity in innovation performance. Other studies find empirical evidence 
that the inclusion of diverse partners increases the probability of achieving 
product innovations (Becker & Dietz, 2004) and increases the novelty of those 
innovations (Nieto & Santamaria, 2007). 
                                                 
15 Cooperative activities in basic research or establishing new standards are potential 
areas of common interest (Amara & Landry, 2005; Gemünden, Heydebreck, & Herden, 
1992), as are activities in the presence of a regulatory change (Tether, 2002). 
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Broadly, greater variety in information inputs of all types benefits the 
innovative ability of the firm. According to evolutionary economists, firms should 
not persist in a specific knowledge trajectory because the benefits decline over 
time (Dosi, 1988). Hence, the firm should rely on different paths to accumulate 
new ideas for innovative activities (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Other scholars argue 
that implementing a diversified cooperating network improves the firm’s capacity 
for organizational learning, its ability to adapt to changes in demand and 
technology, and generally contributes to problem solving and innovation 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). Indeed, recent empirical studies have 
provided some evidence that a broad search strategy for new knowledge and 
innovative ideas can improve firms’ ability to innovate (Henttonen & Ritala, 
2013; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Sofka & Grimpe, 2010).  
These reflections and findings are in alignment with our expectation that 
diversity in cooperation partner types within its collaborative network can 
increase the firm’s innovation output. 
Our first hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 3.1: The more diverse a firm’s cooperation arrangements with 
external partners are, the higher its innovation output performance will be. 
3.2.4 Impact of diversity in cooperation partners and innovation performance  
The benefits of joint innovative activities increase as the external partner’s 
resources and capabilities better complement the firm’s own available resources. 
Cooperating with external partners 
72 
However, these benefits must be weighted against transactions costs (Pisano, 
1990; Williamson, 1989). These costs are incurred in the coordination, 
management, and control of all partners (Knudsen & Mortensen, 2011; Nieto & 
Santamaria, 2007). Specificity of assets, asymmetric information, opportunistic 
behavior, and uncertainty about the appropriability of expected innovation returns 
also factor into the costs of cooperation. The integration of diverse partners 
creates better exploitation of complementary resources and capabilities, but this 
relationship may be affected by mounting transaction costs. We take the above-
mentioned costs into consideration in our analysis of the relationship between 
diversity in cooperation partner types and innovation performance.  
We also account for each partner type as a separate search and learning space 
embedded in an environment with different routines, habits, norms, and rules 
(Brown & Duguid, 2002; Cook & Brown, 1999b). Despite the possibility that 
establishing new linkages to diverse partners can generate substantial innovation 
advantages for the firm, there is the inherent risk of increased opportunistic 
behavior. In that regard, relying on limited types of partners can facilitate 
innovative activities by establishing routines (Levinthal & March, 1981) and 
forming reliable and trustworthy ties between cooperation partners. Different 
knowledge domains require different organizational practices to manage 
knowledge search effectively and efficiently, and this may be especially 
challenging if multiple types of partners are involved. In addition, managing 
relationships to external partners requires managerial attention, which is not an 
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unlimited resource (Ocasio, 1997). In a nutshell, we expect that diversity in 
cooperation partners might be advisable for a firm, but that the integration of too 
many different types of cooperation partners could be negatively related to 
innovation performance because of its high complexity. 
Hypothesis 3.2: The relationship between diversity in types of cooperation 
partners and innovation output performance follows an inverted U-shaped 
curvilinear form. 
3.2.5 Diversity in cooperation partners as moderated by internal absorptive 
capacity and firm size 
In order to gather more insights about potential appropriability mechanisms, we 
proceed by analyzing some key moderating effects in the relationship between 
diversity in cooperation partners and innovation performance (see e.g., Ahuja, 
Lampert, & Novell, 2013), starting with the moderating role of internal absorptive 
capacity. The concept of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) 
emphasizes that firms’ in-house R&D activities provide them with the necessary 
know-how to absorb and apply external knowledge and create product 
innovations. Recent research has focused on the moderating effect of firms’ R&D 
efforts on innovation performance (Grimpe & Kaiser, 2010). Previous research 
(Grimpe & Kaiser, 2010; Mowery et al., 1996) has also found positive effects of 
firms’ R&D investments on their ability to take advantage of external knowledge 
sources. Grimpe & Kaiser (2010) argue that firm-specific (internal) R&D 
expenditures enhance the firm’s ability to improve its “integrative capabilities,” 
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which improves exploitation of resource and technology combinations derived 
from both internal and external sources. Thus, conducting high levels of (internal) 
R&D activities prevents the loss of valuable process knowledge in manufacturing 
and engineering, while helping the firm fully exploit external knowledge (Kotabe, 
1990; Weigelt, 2009). In this way, R&D investment is considered a justifiable 
proxy for internal absorptive capacity. We assume that higher levels of R&D 
expenditures positively moderate the relationship between diversity in types of 
cooperation partners and innovation performance. 
Hypothesis 3.3: The relationship between diversity in cooperation partner 
types and innovation output performance is positively moderated by higher 
levels of R&D expenditures such that maximum innovation performance can 
be achieved with more diverse cooperation partners. 
The literature has shown that firm size plays a characteristic role in innovation 
activities (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002). As small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are necessarily limited in size and human and financial resources, 
collaborative innovation provides them with an interesting mode of organizing 
their innovation activities and gaining access to externally located knowledge 
sources (Gronum, Verreynne, & Kastelle, 2012; Kesting et al., 2011; Powell et al., 
1996; Teirlinck & Spithoven, 2013; van de Vrande et al., 2009). However, 
organizing external relationships costs resources and managerial attention, and it 
can be challenging for SMEs to manage a diversified network effectively. 
Consequently, smaller firms might not see the full potential of their external 
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relationships. Conversely, smaller firms may have a better overall view of their 
collaboration network than larger firms, and may be better able to place people 
with the ideal combination of business sense and technological expertise in the 
right places to reap the full value of cooperative arrangements. We expect that 
smaller size positively moderates the relationship between diversity in 
cooperation networks and innovation outputs. We therefore state the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.4: The relationship between diversity in cooperation partner 
types and innovation output performance is positively moderated by small-
sized firms, such that maximum innovation performance can be achieved with 
more diverse cooperation partners. 
3.3 Data and model specification 
3.3.1 Data  
For the empirical analysis, this study uses micro-aggregated firm-level data from 
Swiss firms. The data is derived from postal innovation surveys conducted by the 
Swiss Economic Institute (KOF) in the years 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. 
In total, the panel contains 11814 observations from 5703 firms. The aim of the 
survey is to observe and collect data about technological innovation. The 
questionnaires are methodologically similar to the well-established Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) from the European Commission. The dataset is designed 
as a panel and contains detailed firm-level data on firm characteristics (size, 
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exports, sector affiliation), R&D and innovation activities, cooperation motives, 
and general activities among other things. The survey provides a representative 
sample of Swiss firms, including firms from all relevant manufacturing, service, 
and construction sectors. The survey is based on a disproportionate stratified 
random sample (according to firm size), capturing firms with at least five 
employees but with full coverage of the upper part of the distribution. The 
response rates are 33.8% (1999), 39.6% (2002), 38.7% (2005), 36.1% (2008), and 
35.9% (2011). In our study, we focus on R&D active firms; thus we only use data 
from firms that conducted R&D activities in the relevant period.16 The final panel 
for analysis is comprised of 4488 observations from 2649 firms. The average firm 
participates 1.7 times in the survey, which is satisfactory regarding the relevant 
time span of the survey.  
3.3.2 Model specification  
For the purpose of this study, we define diversity in a collaboration network as the 
number of different types of partners having a formal R&D cooperation 
arrangement with the focal firm. In our analysis, we define seven different types 
of cooperation partners: customers and clients, suppliers, competitors, non-
competing firms, firms from the same corporate group, universities, and other 
research institutions. In total, we estimate four different model specifications to 
                                                 
16 As not all firms in our panel are involved in R&D activities and we do not control for 
possible selection bias, our results can only be interpreted for firms that conduct R&D. 
The Heckman procedure is one possibility to detect a possible bias in the sample. 
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explain innovation performance. In the first, we begin by assessing whether the 
inclusion of different types of cooperation partners influences innovation 
performance (model 1). Therefore, we include a collaboration diversity variable 
(collab_diversity) in our model to count the number of cooperation partner types. 
Next, we examine the shape of the relationship between diversity in cooperation 
partners and innovation performance (model 2). To control for an inverted U-
shaped curvilinear relationship and potentially decreasing marginal effects of 
diversity, we include the squared term of the collaboration diversity variable 
(Grimpe & Kaiser, 2010; Laursen & Salter, 2006).17 
The final two model specifications test our hypotheses regarding the 
moderating effects of internal absorptive capacity and firm size on the previously 
modeled curvilinear relationship. In model 3, we approximate internal absorptive 
capacity by calculating the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales, and interact 
this with the collaboration diversity variable. In model 4, we test the hypothesis 
on the moderating effect of firm size by interacting collaboration diversity with 
the dummy variable for small-sized firms. A significant positive coefficient would 
indicate a moderating effect for the absorptive capacity or firm size variable and 
would shift the tipping point of the curvilinear form to the right. 
                                                 
17 An inverted U-shaped relationship would be indicated through a positive significant 
coefficient of collaboration diversity variable, and a negative significant coefficient of the 
squared term. Joint significance of both variables would also allow the assumption of an 
inverted U shape (see for example Grimpe & Kaiser, 2010). A detailed discussion of the 
statistical test for a U-shaped relationship provide Lind and Mehlum (2010).  
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A. Dependent variables 
The dependent variable is the output innovation performance of firms. Firms’ 
innovation output is measured by the ratio of new or considerably improved 
product turnover divided by total firm turnover, taking values between 0 and 100. 
In alignment with the definitions of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1992), these 
products have to be new to the firm or modified in a substantial way, excluding 
products with only minor modifications such as customer specifications and 
design adjustments. This measure has broad acceptance in empirical analysis and 
has been used in several previous empirical studies (Belderbos, Carree, & 
Lokshin, 2004b; Grimpe & Kaiser, 2010; Loof & Heshmati, 2002). In our 
analysis, we employ its natural logarithm (e.g. Arvanitis & Bolli, 2012). 
B. Independent variables 
We consider variables that reflect the theoretical and empirical insights explained 
in the previous section. In our model, we take the resource-based approach to 
explaining innovation performance. Diversity in collaboration partner types is 
represented by the variable collab_diversity counting the number of the different 
types of external partners in a firm’s cooperation network. 
Following the argument that the firm’s stock of resources and capabilities is 
crucially important for its benefiting from cooperation with external partners, our 
model captures several firm characteristic variables. The amount of resources 
invested in innovation activities influences the decision to cooperate and the 
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propensity to generate successful innovations (de Faria et al., 2010). Therefore, 
we include a variable (R&D intensity), which is the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of total expenditures in R&D activities to total turnover, as a proxy for the 
intensity of a firm’s devotion of resources to innovation activities.  
According to the concept of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 
1990), pre-existing knowledge and internal technological capacities are essential 
for the exploitation of the benefits of joint innovative activities. In the presence of 
internal technological capacities and capabilities, a firm can take advantage of and 
absorb incoming spillovers as long as there is not significant recontextualization 
(Brannen, 2004). Similarly, a well-prepared firm can better install appropriability 
mechanisms (e.g. patents, copyrights, trademarks, registered designs, complex 
product designs, or lead-time advantages) to protect outgoing spillovers 
(Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002). In order to capture these arguments about 
absorptive capacity, we include a variable for the level of education in a firm’s 
workforce, called tertiary education.18 
The firms’ environment—including level of competitiveness and technological 
potential—affect their propensity to cooperate and innovate. In line with 
Abramovsky et al. (2009), we include a variable to approximate the level of 
competitiveness a firm is facing. We construct the variable firm competiveness as 
the share of exports on total turnover, where export attitude is a proxy for 
                                                 
18 A detailed description of the variables can be found in Table 18 in Appendix 3.6. 
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competitiveness (de Faria et al., 2010). This assumes that a firm with high export 
ratios is embedded in a more competitive environment and also more likely to 
cooperate with external partners (Dachs et al., 2008). Following the theoretical 
argument and empirical findings that the technological environment in which a 
firm operates influences cooperation propensity and innovation performance 
(Bayona, Garcia-Marco, & Huerta, 2001; Miotti & Sachwald, 2003), our model 
contains a variable (technological potential) to control for different technology 
levels. 
Firm size and other intrinsic factors are also influential for innovation 
activities. We include a firm size variable (firm size, log). However, the effect of 
firm size on the decision to engage in cooperative activities with external partners 
is ambiguous. Cohen & Levinthal (1990) state that with increasing firm size a 
firm possesses higher absorptive capacity and is able to devote more resources to 
innovation activities. Consequently, they argue that firm size is linked with a 
higher propensity to cooperate. Contrarily, Cassiman & Veugelers (2002) remark 
that with increasing firm size, the capabilities of a firm increase along with the 
possibility to conduct innovation activities internally without the necessity of 
including external parties. Thus, it is not a priori clear how firm size affects 
innovation performance. As younger firms are expected to be more innovative in 
order to gain market access, our model controls for firm age. Furthermore, our 
model includes dummy variables for industry affiliation, and survey years. 
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3.4 Results and discussion 
3.4.1 Descriptive results 
As can been seen from Table 14, 65.6% of the innovating firms conduct R&D and 
23.5% cooperate with external partners over the five waves of the survey. The 
average number of different cooperation types is slightly above three. With 
respect to partner types, Table 16 in the Appendix 3.6 represents the shares of 
cooperating firms with cooperation arrangements with customers (average 
62.5%), suppliers (68.5%), competitors (35.1%), non-competing firms (39.4%), 
firms from the same corporate group (41.5%), universities (54.7%), and other 
research institutions (28.5%) for each wave. 
Table 14: Frequencies and percentages of firms successfully innovating, conducting 
R&D, and cooperating with external partners; as well as the average amount of 
cooperation partner types in 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. 
      Thereof     Thereof 
Years   Innovating  R&D Cooperating  Collaboration partners 
1999 
  
1355 (62.4%)   891 (66.3%) 341 (38.5%) 
 
3.31 
2002 
  
1539 (59.5%)   1075 (70.2%) 300 (19.6%) 
 
3.15 
2005 
  
1488 (58.2%)   974 (65.5%) 372 (25.3%) 
 
3.17 
2008 
  
1265 (59.7%)   768 (60.7%) 287 (22.7%) 
 
3.51 
2011 
 
1274 (53.9%)  822 (64.5%) 320 (25.1%) 
 
3.38 
Total 
  
6919 (58.6 %)  4528 (65.6%) 1621 (23.5%) 
 
 
3.4.2 Estimation procedure 
We apply a random-effect panel Tobit model to estimate our model. Following 
other studies with similar data characteristics (e.g. Arvanitis & Bolli, 2012), we 
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choose a Tobit estimation procedure because many firms do not have any sales 
with market novelties and hence our dependent variable would be characterized 
by a “corner solution” around 0. In order to derive unbiased estimates, we use a 
left-censored Tobit model with innovation performance as the dependent variable, 
downward censored at 0. The summary statistics can be found in Table 17 in the 
Appendix 3.6.  
3.4.3 Impact of diversity in cooperation partners on innovation performance 
Table 15 presents the results of the Tobit regression analysis with innovation 
output as the dependent variable. In model 1, the results show a positive and 
highly significant effect for the collaboration diversity variable. Model 2 exhibits 
a significant positive coefficient for collab_diversity and a significant negative 
coefficient for the squared term, indicating that there is a curvilinear relationship 
between diversity in types of cooperation partners and innovation performance.  
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Table 15: Tobit regression estimates for innovation output performance.  
Dependent variable:  
Innovation performance 
Model 1 
Coeff. 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
Model 4 
Coeff. 
Collab_diversity  0.031*** 0.108**  0.111**  0.104**  
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Collab_diversity, squared  -0.165* -0.167* -0.185* 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Interaction (Collab_div.*R&D intensity)   -0.071  
   (0.19)  
Interaction (Collab_div.*smallFirm)    0.051**  
    (0.03) 
R&D intensity (logs) 1.833*** 1.858*** 1.962*** 1.827*** 
                               (0.44) (0.44) (0.53) (0.44) 
Missing R&D intensity (d) -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** 
                               (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Tertiary education 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm size (logs) -0.042**  -0.044**  -0.044**  -0.03 
                               (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Firm age (logs) -0.094*** -0.092**  -0.092**  -0.091**  
                               (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Firm competiveness (logs) 0.588*** 0.594*** 0.594*** 0.602*** 
                               (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Technological potential 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
7 industry dummies χ2 (6)= χ2 (6)= χ2 (6)= χ2 (6)= 
 126.61*** 125.69*** 125.75*** 126.14*** 
5 survey year dummies χ2 (4)= χ2 (4)= χ2 (4)= χ2 (4)= 
 25.83*** 25.25*** 25.33*** 24.99*** 
Constant 1.771*** 1.779*** 1.777*** 1.719*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
N 4488 4488 4488 4488 
Wald chi2 414.09 417.54 417.61 421.96 
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -7520.618 -7519.168 -7519.100 -7517.131 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% test-level. Standard errors 
in parentheses. For all models, the number of left-censored observations is 510. (d), 
indicates a dummy variable.  
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In the next models, we include our interaction terms to analyze the moderating 
effects of internal absorptive capacity and firm size. Referring to model 3, we 
cannot detect a statistically significant moderating effect of internal absorptive 
capacity on sales with innovative products. For the moderating effects of firm 
size, the results in model 4 show a positive and significant coefficient for the 
interaction between small firms and the collaborative diversity variable as well as 
a positive and significant coefficient for collab_diversity and a negatively 
significant coefficient for the squared term. Consequently, the tipping point of the 
inverted U-shaped relationship shifts to the right. 
In accordance with our expectations and in alignment with previous studies 
(e.g. de Faria et al., 2010), the results regarding R&D intensity show a significant 
positive effect between the resources invested in innovative activities and 
innovation output for all of our models. Our additional proxy for absorptive 
capacity—the proportion of employees with tertiary education in the firm’s 
workforce—also positively influences innovation output. Moreover, the results 
indicate a negative impact of firm size and age on innovation output. In line with 
our expectations and previous empirical research (e.g. Abramovsky et al., 2009), 
we detect a strong positive and significant effect of firm competitiveness level on 
innovation outcome. Additionally, our analysis exhibits statistically significant 
evidence that higher levels of technological potential and opportunities relate to 
better innovation performance. The results further show strong economic sector 
affiliation effects. 
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3.4.4 Discussion 
The results reinforce our assumption that diversity in types of cooperation 
partners matters for innovation performance. Evidently, firms can achieve 
performance enhancements with respect to innovation output with increased 
diversity in cooperation partner types. Therefore, hypothesis 3.1 can be 
confirmed. Turning to the potential risk of an over-diversified cooperation 
strategy causing negative returns in innovation output, we assumed a curvilinear 
relationship (inverted U-shape) between diversity in types of cooperation partners 
and innovation output. The results based on model 2 show statistical evidence for 
this functional form, and hypothesis 3.2 can be supported. These findings give 
support to our ideas that innovating firms can benefit from the know-how, 
resources, and capabilities of external partners, and that a wide diversity in types 
of cooperation partners in a cooperation network can enhance firm innovation 
output. However, this only applies to certain levels of diversity: an over-
diversified cooperation network leads to decreasing returns. Finally, these 
findings support the importance of partner-type selectivity in the process of 
collaborative innovation.  
To investigate in more detail how internal absorptive capacity—or more 
precisely how investments in R&D activities—moderates the relationship 
between diversity and innovation performance, we analyzed this moderating 
effect in a separate model. Although our model shows a negative coefficient for 
the interaction term indicating a substitution effect between R&D investments and 
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engagement in external cooperation arrangements, we found no statistically 
significant evidence for this moderating effect. Recall, though, that our interaction 
variable does not represent internal investment in R&D but rather the overall 
expenditures in R&D, meaning that it also includes expenditures on external R&D 
activities. 
To focus on how firm size influences the benefits of external cooperation 
agreements with different types of partners in a cooperation network, we analyzed 
the moderating effect of small firm size. With respect to the moderating effect of 
small size, we can state that small firms derive significantly greater advantages 
from diversity in cooperation partners as compared to other firm-size groups. As 
the tipping point shifts to the right, the results show that small firms benefit more 
from integrating a greater variety of external cooperation partner into their 
cooperation network. 
There are numerous possible theoretical perspectives on the relationship of 
small firms to their cooperation networks, and this finding helps indicate useful 
directions. One idea was that small firms possess only limited internal capacity 
and resources to take advantage of a wide range of external sources of knowledge 
and that it is difficult for small firms to manage a manifold cooperation network; 
these findings are quite counterintuitive to that idea. Instead, these findings hint 
that, for small firms it may be less difficult to pay managerial attention to different 
types of partners than in larger firms. This in turn may suggest that small firms 
have less difficulty managing and controlling relationships to external partners, 
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and that they are more likely to improve their innovation performance by 
complementing their internal resources and capabilities with external partners. 
One explanation for the higher effectiveness of small firms may be the fact that 
organizational issues are less complex and less bureaucratic for small firms 
(Jaruzelski et al., 2012), and as a result small firms are better able to convert ideas 
into innovative products. Another reason for the better performance of small firms 
may be because small firms are more effective in placing the right people with a 
good combination of experience, technology, and business sense in charge of 
managing collaborative relationships (Jaruzelski et al., 2012). 
3.5 Conclusion and future research  
This study investigates the influence of partner type diversity in collaborative 
networks on innovation output performance. Based on an econometric estimation 
using panel data from Swiss firms covering a time period from 1997 to 2011, the 
results show that innovating firms can benefit more with respect to innovation 
performance as measured by sales share of innovative products on total turnover 
from a diversified collaboration network than a more narrow strategy. Further, our 
analysis exhibits a tipping point indicating that the benefits from diversity 
decrease after a certain degree of saturation. Moreover, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study provides the first empirical evidence based on a large-scale 
cross-sectional panel data analysis that the relation between diversity in 
cooperation partner types and innovation performance follows a curvilinear 
relationship. In sum, despite the gains from diversity in cooperation networks, 
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higher diversity can also be linked to risks such as protection of core technologies 
and appropriability mechanisms as well as to managerial attention problems for 
overseeing the manifold relationships to external partners, complex technology 
bases, and business opportunities located outside the firm.   
In this way, our work contributes to a better understanding of the effects of 
firms’ cooperation decisions on innovation performance. This additional 
knowledge is not only necessary for the development of appropriate innovation 
and technology policies that foster national competitiveness from a policy point of 
view, but also for the definition and creation of appropriate HRM and knowledge 
management policies and practices that facilitate and foster innovative activities 
in firms from a managerial point of view.  
Overall, the findings support our theoretical reflections that firms are able to 
benefit in terms of increased innovation performance by complementing their 
internal resources and capabilities and gaining access to external partners. In a 
business environment in which firms are exposed to increasing competition from 
not only a national but also a global point of view, firms need to become 
successful innovators. In this regard, it is essential to identify effective 
mechanisms that help derive positive results from increasing diversity. Therefore, 
future research could deal with evaluating specific appropriability mechanisms 
influencing innovative capabilities (Ahuja et al., 2013). From a strategic 
management perspective, managerial decision makers should carefully evaluate 
the firm’s cooperation strategy in order to find the balance between the 
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advantages of special knowledge and technologies located outside the firm and 
the problems and risks associated with knowledge leaking out. HRM and 
knowledge management are challenged to create appropriate practices and 
policies enabling firms to better exploit their external cooperation network. 
Another area of future empirical research could elaborate how modern HRM 
practices—including HRM flexibility— affect innovative capabilities (see e.g., 
Way et al., 2012). Our study has further shown that the gains from diversity in 
cooperation network are moderated by firm size. However, there is still some 
need for future research. It is still unclear which mechanisms in smaller firms 
drive increased innovation performance. Future research should identify effective 
mechanisms and try to adapt them to larger enterprises.  
In our study we have only taken into account the impact of the diversity of 
general types of cooperation partners, without consideration for the national origin 
of those partners. From one point of view, cooperation with international partners 
could enable firms to take advantage of special knowledge and technologies from 
abroad; on the other side international cooperation arrangements come with 
additional problems and risks such as cultural and social distance, and different 
intellectual protection rights and laws. Going one step further, future research 
could deal with the question of how cultural and social factors affect relationships 
in a cooperation network, and could investigate their impact on innovation 
performance. 
  
3.6 Appendix  
Table 16: Frequencies and shares of cooperating firms with respect to their types of cooperation partner. 
Years Cooperating Customers Suppliers Competitors Non- Competitors Firms from same 
corporate group 
Universities Other Research 
Institutions 
1999 341 199 (59.6%) 225 (67.4%) 136 (40.7%) 130 (38.9%) 141 (42.2%) 175 (52.4%) 101 (30.2%) 
2002 300 176 (59.9%) 197 (67.0%) 111 (37.8%) 118 (40.1%) 114 (38.8%) 139 (47.3%) 72 (24.5%) 
2005 372 221 (60.2%) 249 (67.9%) 129 (35.2%) 123 (33.5%) 150 (40.9%) 203 (55.3%) 88 (24.0%) 
2008 287 194 (67.8%) 204 (71.3%) 97 (33.9%) 125 (43.7%) 122 (42.7%) 170 (59.4%) 93 (32.5%) 
2011 320 207 (65.7%) 218 (69.2%) 87 (27.6%) 133 (42.2%) 135 (42.9%) 185 (58.7%) 101 (32.1%) 
Total 1300 997 (62.5%) 1093 (68.5%) 560 (35.1%) 628 (39.4%) 662 (41.5%) 872 (54.7%) 455 (28.5%) 
 
Table 17: Summary statistics, and cross correlation matrix of relevant variables.  
  Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Innovation performance 4488 31.455 27.391 0 100         
2 Collab_diversity 4488 1.165 1.843 0 7 - 1.00       
3 R&D intensity (log) 4488 0.026 0.068 0 1.013 - 0.09 1.00      
4 Tertiary education  4888 - - - - - 0.14 0.30 1.00     
5 Firm size (log) 4488 375.503 2,163.585 1 60,000 - 0.22 -0.06 0.00 1.00    
6 Firm age (log) 4488 65.520 42.854 1 645 - 0.02 -0.14 -0.16 0.26 1.00   
7 Competitiveness (log) 4488 0.376 0.378 0 1.00 - 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.18 -0.05 1.00  
8 Technological Potential 4488 3.069 1.088 1 5 - 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.16 -0.07 0.23 1.00 
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Table 18: Description of relevant variables.  
Variable Description 
  
Dependent variable 
 
lnInSales Natural logarithm of the sales shares of innovative 
products (sum of the sales of new products and 
considerably modified products) on total turnover. 
Independent variables  
Collab_Diversity 
Continuous variable. Represents the firm's amount of 
different types of external cooperation partners. The 
number ranges between 0 and 7.   
R&D intensity (log) 
Natural logarithm of R&D expenditures divided by total 
sales. 
Missing R&D intensity 
Dummy variable; 1 represents firms with a missing value 
for R&D intensity. 0 otherwise. 
Tertiary education 
Share of employees with tertiary education on total 
workforce. 
Firm size (log) 
Natural logarithm of the amount of employees (full time 
equivalents). 
Small firm  
Dummy variable; 1 represents firms with a firm size 
smaller than 150. 0 otherwise. 
Firm age (log) Natural logarithm of firm age. 
Competitiveness (log) 
Represents the level of competitiveness measured as 
share of exports on total turnover. 
Technological Potential 
Nominal variable; represents the general technological 
potential, i.e. scientific and technological knowledge 
relevant to the firm's R&D or innovation activity (on a 
five point Likert-scale; 1 very low, 5 very high 
technological potential). 
Construction 
2-digit NACE classification code. Mining, construction, 
energy (10-14, and 40-41). 
Consumer goods Consumer goods (NACE code: 15-19) 
Intermediate goods Intermediate goods (NACE code: 20-27) 
Investment goods Investment goods (NACE code: 28-37) 
Traditional services 
Traditional services excluding hotels and restaurants 
(NACE code: 50-52; 60-64) 
Knowledge-based services Knowledge-based services (NACE code:65-67; 72-74) 
Other services 
Other services (NACE code: 55; 70-71; 80; 8511; 853; 
90; 92) 
Survey year 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011 
Dummy variable; 1 represents the relevant survey year 
period. 0 otherwise.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Innovation outcomes and partner-type selection in R&D alliances: 
The role of simultaneous diversification and sequential adaptation  
 
This chapter is co-authored with Cindy Lopes-Bento.  
 
 
Abstract: This study focuses on how firms form and sequentially adapt their 
inter-organizational knowledge sourcing structures within research and 
development (R&D) alliances and how this process impacts their innovation 
performance. In contrast to the previous literature that mainly ignores the dynamic 
aspects of how firms adapt their search strategies, our approach accounts for 
sequential adaptation. Our proposed framework explores the role of simultaneous 
diversification and sequential adaptation of collaboration partners within R&D 
alliances according to specific innovation outcomes. The results emphasize that 
firms should not remain within the same search activities indefinitely, as non-
adapting inter-organizational knowledge transfer structures lead to inferior 
performance. Notably, this study highlights important partner-type selectivity and 
identifies appropriate simultaneous diversification and sequential adaptation 
strategies in relation to specific innovation outcomes and firm sizes. 
Keywords: Strategic alliances; organizational learning; sequential adaptation; 
simultaneous diversification; R&D collaboration; innovation strategy; innovation 
performance; radical innovation; incremental innovation. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Today’s highly competitive and rapidly changing market and technological 
environment challenge firms to effectively manage their innovation search 
activities. One of the strategies that firms undertake to respond to these challenges 
is to form strategic research and development (R&D) alliances with external 
partners to gain access to new technologies, complementary know-how and other 
additional resources (Gulati et al., 2000; Mowery et al., 1996). The ways in which 
firms are able to manage these inter-organizational structures of knowledge 
exchange and technology transfer with external sources are crucial for the firms’ 
innovativeness and long-term competiveness, and this type of management 
represents a key aspect of managerial decision making and organizational learning 
(Argote & Ingram, 2000; Teece et al., 1997).  
However, important issues remain: we must determine which structural 
patterns of R&D alliance partners are most appropriate to achieving specific 
innovation outcomes. Moreover, firms must decide how to organize the dynamic 
adaptation of collaboration partner types in R&D alliances. For instance, firms 
could maintain the same collaboration patterns to benefit from experience with the 
same partners, or they could adapt partners more frequently to be more dynamic, 
and therefore, able to react more quickly to changing market demands. These 
issues culminate in the focus of our study on how should firms simultaneous and 
sequentially select their collaboration partners in R&D alliances to meet specific 
objectives.  
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Despite the importance of these partner-type selection issues for firms’ 
competitive advantage, surprisingly few studies have focused on their dynamic 
aspects (Bakker & Knoben, 2014; Belderbos, Carree, Lokshin, & Sastre, 2015; 
Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Even more surprisingly, little is known about the 
performance implications of the dynamic adaptation of R&D alliances. The 
objective of this paper is to fill this void by deriving a conceptual framework and 
empirically testing the role of simultaneous diversification and sequential 
adaptations of types of collaboration partners in R&D alliances to generate 
specific firm innovation outcomes, such as radical or incremental innovations. 
First, we focus on simultaneous patterns of inter-organizational collaboration, and 
our goal is to identify appropriate simultaneous diversification patterns of R&D 
partners to achieve specific firm innovation outcomes. Second, we focus on the 
sequential adaptation of R&D alliances and explore the effective sequential 
adaptation strategies of collaboration partner types to generate different 
innovation outcomes. A more profound understanding about which adaptation 
strategies are aligned to specific innovation outcomes is crucial for managers. 
This knowledge would increase managers’ ability to effectively orient 
organizational resources along firms’ innovation objectives of fostering either 
radical or incremental innovations. Finally, as the previous literature indicates that 
organizational learning is affected by the firm size, our conceptual framework 
accounts for different firm size classes (Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2014; 
Brunswicker & Vanhaverbeke, 2015; Patel & Pavitt, 1997; Zeng et al., 2010).  
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By enlarging the understanding of how simultaneous and sequential selections 
of collaboration partner types are associated to innovation outcomes, our study 
contributes to the literature on organizational learning, innovation strategies, and 
open innovation (Arora et al., 2014; Chesbrough, 2003a; Levitt & March, 1988). 
Hence, this study operates at the crossroads of the organizational learning and 
strategic alliance literature by linking the impact of various structural alliance 
compositions to innovation performance implications. In particular, we contribute 
to the literature on R&D alliances and organizational learning by providing new 
insights about the performance implications of the dynamic adaptation of R&D 
partners in strategic alliances. These structures and mechanisms of dynamic inter-
organizational knowledge exchanges and technology transfers within R&D 
alliances are still unclear and deserve further research (Bakker & Knoben, 2014; 
Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Easterby‐ Smith, Lyles, & Tsang, 2008; Kale & Singh, 
2009; Laursen & Salter, 2014).  
To extend the conceptual understanding of inter-organizational knowledge 
exchanges and technology transfers within R&D alliances, we introduce the 
concepts of simultaneous partner diversification and sequential partner adaptation. 
Our approach links these concepts to different innovation outcomes and examines 
whether certain simultaneous diversification and specific sequential adaptation 
strategies are associated with superior innovation outcomes. The previous 
literature has largely acknowledged the use of interfirm R&D alliances to 
integrate technology-based capabilities and other forms of knowledge from 
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external collaboration partners such as suppliers, customers, competitors or 
science centers (Kogut, 1988; Mowery et al., 1996). However, there is a lack of 
understanding of how different compositions of alliance partners influence the 
opportunities to enhance the technological capabilities and innovation 
performance of firms. In particular, there is a void in the empirical research with 
respect to how technological opportunities of firms are affected by inter-
organizational structures of knowledge exchanges. Part of this void can be 
attributed to the difficulties in measuring changes in the technological potential of 
a firm (Mowery et al., 1996). To advance the knowledge in this field, this study 
introduces a new measure that accounts for a change in the firm’s opportunities 
for technological capabilities and relates this measure to more traditional 
indicators of innovation outcomes such as radical and incremental innovation 
performance (Beck, Lopes-Bento, & Schenker-Wicki, 2014; Meuer et al., 2015).   
In our study, based on a sample of 2,087 Swiss firms for the period 1999-2013 
and stemming from Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data, we find evidence 
of partner-type selectivity in R&D alliances in relation to specific innovation 
outcomes. In addition, our results highlight the importance of firms effectively 
adapting their inter-organizational knowledge structures according to both specific 
innovation outcomes and their own sizes. Based on our findings, we can draw 
important managerial implications, and by systemically acknowledging the 
dynamics within R&D alliances, our study enlarges the development of an 
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innovation theory that accounts for the organizational dynamics in firms’ 
innovation activities. 
4.2 Theoretical background and conceptual framework  
4.2.1 Inter-organizational learning in R&D alliances 
Organizations face the challenge of finding solutions for technological problems 
in changing market and technological environments. In addition to the possibility 
of solving a problem with the current routines and practices, organizations can 
initiate learning and search processes by including external sources of knowledge 
(March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Overall, firms have the ability 
to make (internal R&D), buy (external R&D) or organize (R&D collaboration) the 
necessary knowledge and technology (Arora et al., 2014). Finding an optimal 
interplay between internal and external searches represents a fundamental facet of 
innovation theory and constitutes a crucial managerial task (Koka & Prescott, 
2008; Laursen & Salter, 2014; Levinthal & March, 1993; Li & Rowley, 2002; 
Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009; Rivkin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997).  
Given the increasing importance of openness in the innovation process, re-
combinations of existing solutions to solve new technological problems form a 
crucial part of innovation and are often found outside the boundaries of the firm. 
Open innovation practices cannot only be found in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) (Brunswicker & Vanhaverbeke, 2015; Cerchione, Esposito, & 
Spadaro, 2015; Hottenrott & Lopes-Bento, 2014a; van de Vrande et al., 2009; 
Zeng et al., 2010), though SMEs may be more exposed to the lack of internal 
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complementarities of resources, capabilities and know-how; instead, those 
practices are also present in large firms. An example of the effectiveness of this 
integrated approach of external knowledge sourcing in large firms is the case of 
Roche Diagnostics (Birkinshaw & Crainer, 2009). To gather experience on 
whether Roche is able to effectively harvest ideas and solutions from external 
sources of knowledge, Roche conducted an experimental learning challenge in 
which it compared the results of an R&D research team composed by exclusively 
internal R&D workers to the pay-offs of an integrated external community of 
R&D workers. The findings showed that by drawing on a mix of knowledge 
derived from internal and external networks, Roche was able to overcome their 
traditional search routines and could create some brilliant and unexpected 
solutions to apparently intractable problems.  
The previous literature highlights that joint R&D activities with external 
partners in R&D alliances constitute an important mechanism in the process of 
organizational learning to create, retain and transfer knowledge (Argote, 2011; 
Gulati et al., 2000). These inter-organizational structures of knowledge transfers 
with different types of partners increase the complementarities of existing 
knowledge within the firm and can constitute an essential source of competitive 
advantage and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). Empirical studies 
confirm the positive effects of these complementarities between different types of 
partners on the innovation performance (Belderbos, Carree, & Lokshin, 2006). 
However, very little is known about the complementarities and congruencies 
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between different external partners and how to match them according to different 
innovation objectives, such as radical or incremental innovation outcomes. 
According to Teece et al. (1997), this recognition is critical to understanding 
organizational learning.   
As argued above, different complementarities between collaboration partners 
can lead to different innovation outcomes. Our approach explicitly relates specific 
compositions of R&D alliances to different types of innovation outcomes.19 
According to Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008), a central aspect in the organizational 
literature regarding technological innovation is the distinction between 
incremental and radical innovation (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Atuahene-Gima, 
2005; Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986). Incremental innovations represent significant but relatively minor 
improvements or adaptations of existing products or business concepts. In 
contrast, radical innovations, as stated by Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008), “refer to 
fundamental changes leading to a switch from existing products or concepts to 
completely new ones.”20 Further studies have noted that organizations often 
                                                 
19 The previous literature emphasizes the existence of major heterogeneities in the 
motives and objectives for collaboration (Belderbos et al., 2004a; de Faria et al., 2010; 
Kaiser, 2002; Tether, 2002). For instance, Belderbos et al. (2004b) show that 
collaboration with competitors or suppliers aims at enhancing labor productivity growth, 
whereas collaboration with universities or competitors can increase market novelties. 
20 In this line, other literature in the field of organizational ambidexterity (Raisch, 
Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009; Tushman & Smith, 2002) relates incremental 
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pursue both types of innovations. Scholars assume that effectively balancing both 
types of innovations can enhance dynamic capabilities and provide additional 
competitive advantage (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001; 
Colbert, 2004). However, there are various organizational tensions (such as the 
“capability-rigidity paradox”) to finding an appropriate balance between different 
innovation objectives (Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) and the 
interrelationships between internal and external knowledge sourcing processes 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Lin, Yang, & Demirkan, 
2007; Raisch et al., 2009). The present approach builds and extends the previous 
theory regarding the performance implications of inter-organizational structures of 
knowledge exchanges in relation to specific types of innovation outcomes. 
4.2.2 Conceptual framework  
Extending the current literature, our approach introduces the concepts of 
simultaneous partner diversification and sequential partner adaptation, and it 
connects these concepts of inter-organizational mechanisms of knowledge 
exchange with different firm innovation outcomes. Contrary to the previous 
studies in this field, our approach provides a conceptual framework to explicitly 
explore the role of dynamic adaptations of R&D collaboration patterns that are 
related to different innovation outcomes. 
  
                                                                                                                                     
innovations to exploitive relationships and radical innovations to explorative 
relationships. 
Innovation outcomes and partner-type selection in R&D alliances  
 
101 
Simultaneous partner diversification 
Our first key concept is simultaneous partner diversification. This concept refers 
to simultaneous partnership diversification within R&D alliances, and it explicitly 
accounts for the complementarity effects between collaborating partner types at 
the same time.  
In our setting, a firm can use various collaboration partner types such as 
suppliers and customers (vertical partners), competitors (horizontal partners), or 
universities (scientific partners) in its search activities. Following the idea of 
communities of practices by Cook and Brown (1999a), each of these channels is 
aligned to different collaboration partner types and represents a separate search 
space with different institutional norms, habits, and rules; however, each channel 
also requires appropriate organizational practices to manage these partnerships 
effectively (Beck & Schenker–Wicki, 2014; Laursen & Salter, 2006). For 
instance, collaborating with end-users requires different skills, mind-sets, 
experience and knowledge than collaborating with an international research 
laboratory, including different intellectual property practices, norms of disclosure, 
and social and cultural attitudes. According to evolutionary economists (Metcalfe, 
1994; Nelson & Winter, 1982), this variety and complementarity can help firms to 
find and create new combinations of technologies and knowledge. However, firms 
must be careful not to over-search, as over-searching can be related to the costs 
exceeding the benefits based on a certain threshold (Beck & Schenker–Wicki, 
2014; Laursen & Salter, 2006). For instance, lacking managerial expertise and 
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ineffective managerial attention may lead firms to not select the right partners and 
to coordinate inefficiently (Katila et al., 2008).  
While some previous studies, such as Belderbos et al. (2006), take the 
complementary composition of R&D collaboration into account, they do not 
relate these patterns to different degrees of innovation novelty. Although other 
studies account for different degrees of innovation novelty created by knowledge 
sourcing strategies (Laursen & Salter, 2006), they ignore the structural 
composition of complementary partnerships within R&D alliances. Thus, our 
approach combines these two perspectives and interrelates simultaneous partner 
diversification with different types of innovation outcomes. 
In summation, after acknowledging the existence of complementarity effects 
between collaboration partner types, it remains unclear which combinations of 
partner types are associated with which innovation outcomes. In our framework, 
we argue that specific simultaneous diversification patterns are more appropriate 
to achieving different types of innovation outcomes. In this vein, we expect that 
firms that manage to organize their external knowledge exchanges with the best 
potential complementarity mix between the focal firms’ resources, capabilities, 
and innovation objectives and their partners’ resources and know-how show 
superior innovation performance. This expectation leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4.1: Simultaneous partner diversification within R&D alliances is 
associated with specific innovation outcomes, and this relationship shows 
important partner-type selectivity effects. 
Sequential partner adaptation 
Our second key concept refers to sequential partner adaptation. Some scholars 
note that if we ignore sequential adaptation, the extent of the complementarity 
effects between collaboration partner types will not be fully taken into account 
(Battisti, Colombo, & Rabbiosi, 2014; Jovanovic & Stolyarov, 2000; Smith, 
2005). Our approach accounts at least partly for the dynamics within R&D 
alliances and contributes to the reasoning on how routines and path-dependent 
behavior in firms’ knowledge sourcing strategies is related to innovation 
outcomes in changing external environments (Koka & Prescott, 2008; Li & 
Rowley, 2002).  
As some studies argue that long-term firm success requires an organizational 
balance between continuity and change (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008), we expect superior performance in those firms that 
sequentially adapt their organizational knowledge sourcing structures. 
Accordingly, the next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.2: Firms that sequentially adapt their collaboration patterns in 
R&D alliances exhibit superior innovation performance compared to firms 
that persist in having the same collaboration patterns. 
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We extend this reasoning and argue that firms should not only change their 
collaboration patterns over time, but should also pay attention to where to search 
for new knowledge and technology. To that end, the (dynamic) selection among 
different collaboration partner types is relevant. The previous literature on 
collaboration indicates a major heterogeneity between partners and emphasizes 
that where to search is relevant for innovation (Belderbos et al., 2004a; Cassiman 
& Veugelers, 2006; Kaiser, 2002). Following this logic, we argue that 
heterogeneity is not only important in the simultaneous selection of partners but 
also in the dynamic adaptation of collaboration partners. Consequently, we expect 
that in addition to changing their collaboration patterns, it is important for firms to 
adapt their collaboration partners effectively and to select appropriate partners to 
achieve specific innovation outcomes. This notion leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4.3: R&D alliances exhibit important partner-type selectivity 
effects with respect to the impact and direction of sequential adaptation of 
collaboration partner types and the associated innovation outcomes. 
Firm size 
Several scholars have noted that the relationship between inter-organizational 
structures of knowledge exchange and innovation depends on the firm size (Arora 
et al., 2014; Beck & Schenker–Wicki, 2014; Belderbos et al., 2006). The literature 
also notes that the firm’s size may be linked to features such as its absorptive 
capacity or previous alliance experience (Sampson, 2005). Hence, we observe 
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characteristics that are aligned to influence the outcomes of R&D collaborations. 
In our next step, we take the firm size into account to analyze the sensitivity of 
our results to these characteristics. While these studies refer to simultaneous 
structures of knowledge exchange (Beck & Schenker–Wicki, 2014; Belderbos et 
al., 2006), there are several reasons why we argue that the firm size also affects 
the role of the sequential adaptation of knowledge structures for specific 
innovation outcomes. 
First, change and transformation processes are related to costs (Teece et al., 
1997). Second, these processes require managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) and 
coordination (Atuahene-Gima, 2005). These aspects demand financial and 
managerial resources that are differently allocated between SMEs and large firms. 
Hence, the ability and capacity to manage reconfigurations of knowledge 
structures may depend on characteristics that are aligned with firm size. Overall, 
we expect that the role of simultaneous partner diversification and sequential 
partner adaptation in achieving specific innovation outcomes will vary based on 
the firm size. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4.4: The relationship between simultaneous diversification, 
sequential adaptation in R&D alliances and the associated innovation 
outcomes is moderated by the firm size. 
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4.3 Data and methods  
4.3.1 Sample  
The empirical analysis uses data that are derived from the Swiss Innovation 
Survey. This survey has been conducted every three years by the Swiss Economic 
Institute (KOF) at the ETH Zurich since 1990. The survey is part of the European 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European statistical office (Eurostat) 
and follows the guidelines described in the Oslo manual developed by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 
1997). This dataset provides us with a representative sample of Swiss firms with 
at least five employees from both the manufacturing and service industries. The 
sample contains firm-level information on innovation activities, R&D 
expenditures, knowledge sourcing, intellectual property practices, and 
performance measures among many other firm characteristics. The CIS and the 
Swiss Innovation Survey constitute a reliable, valid and well-established source of 
information on firms’ innovative activities and commercial success. Indeed, the 
datasets derived from these surveys have been used in a wide range of recent and 
prominent studies (Arvanitis, 2012; Beck et al., 2014; Cassiman & Veugelers, 
2002; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010; Meuer et al., 2015). In 
our analysis, we use information from six consecutive waves covering a time 
period from 1999 to 2013. The postal survey received response rates of 33.8 % 
(1999), 39.6 % (2002), 38.7 % (2005), 36.1 % (2008), 35.9 % (2011), and 32.7 % 
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(2013).21 After eliminating the missing values, we restrict our sample to those 
firms that are observed at least in two consecutive waves. In total, our dataset 
comprises 3993 observations from 2087 different firms.    
4.3.2 Empirical strategy 
In our analysis, we focus on the role of simultaneous diversification and 
sequential adaptation strategies in R&D alliances in firms’ innovation 
performance. Our models measure how firms’ innovation outcomes are associated 
with specific simultaneous diversification and sequential adaptation strategies as 
well as other firm characteristics. Because firms make their managerial choices 
about their diversification and adaptation strategies based on different innovation 
objectives, we account for three different innovation outcomes to evaluate the 
effectiveness of these diversification and adaptation strategies, namely, the firm’s 
relative technological potential, radical innovation and incremental innovation 
output.  
Following the previous literature, we define the radical innovation performance as 
the share of generated sales attributed to innovative products that are new to the 
firm, and we define the incremental innovation performance as products that are 
                                                 
21 From 1999 until 2011, the survey was conducted every three years, but from the 
beginning of 2013 the Swiss Economic Institute changed the timing of the survey to 
every two years. The structure of the responses for different industry affiliations, regions, 
and sizes are largely consistent with the previous surveys. An overview on the innovation 
surveys from 1999 to 2013 and the corresponding innovation activities of Swiss firms 
from 1997 to 2012 can be found in Arvanitis et al. (2014).  
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significantly improved (Beck et al., 2014; Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Meuer et al., 
2015). Accounting for the firm’s relative technological position, we introduce a 
new measure that indicates if a firm is able to improve its technological potential 
towards the technological frontier within an industry. This measure of 
technological opportunities has so far not received much attention in the empirical 
literature (Teece et al., 1997). However, we acknowledge that firms choose their 
collaboration strategy to devise a solution to a certain technological shortcoming 
(Mowery et al., 1996), and we believe that accounting for the effectiveness of 
enhancing the technological potential indicates a good measure of the success or 
failure of different collaboration strategies. By including this measure, we expect 
to derive additional insights on how firms can improve their technological 
capabilities through collaboration. 
With respect to our concepts of simultaneous diversification and sequential 
adaptations of collaboration partner types in R&D alliances, we differentiate 
between eight simultaneous diversification and seven sequential adaptation 
strategies (see Figure 1). For the simultaneous diversification of collaboration 
partner types, the exclusive combinations of vertical, horizontal, and scientific 
collaboration compose the eight strategies. The sequential adaptation strategies 
are characterized by either remaining persistent within the current pattern or 
opening towards or shunning vertical, horizontal or scientific partner types. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual framework 
 
Given the strong unbalanced nature of our panel dataset, we make use of the 
pooled cross-sectional structure of our data to estimate our models. We use robust 
clustered standard errors to account for the potential correlations of the errors, and 
we include a substantial set of control variables. For our first outcome measure 
that indicates the relative technological potential, we estimate probit models such 
that the dependent variable for the relative technological potential of a firm equals 
one if its technological potential is higher than the firms’ average in a given 
period. The binary response models are estimated as follows:  
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖  (4.3.1) 
𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0], 𝜀𝑖~𝒩(0, 𝜎
2) 
where the binary variable 𝑦𝑖 indicates the sign of the unobserved latent variable 
𝑦𝑖
∗.  
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 For the equations that estimate firms’ innovation performance, we apply 
pooled regression models with radical and incremental innovation performance as 
the dependent variables. These variables are measured as the ratio of the radical 
(incremental) innovative sales to the total turnover. Because these variables by 
definition range between 0 and 100, and because not all firms have innovative 
sales in each period, our data are characterized by corner solution outcomes 
around 0 (Winkelmann & Boes, 2006; Wooldridge, 2010). For our analysis, we 
use Tobit models to account for these censored dependent variables. With our 
approach, we are in line with previous empirical studies that faced similar data 
characteristics (Bakker & Knoben, 2014). As argued in Greene (2003), standard 
Tobit models require the assumption of homoscedasticity. As LR tests of the 
residuals indicate violations of the homoscedasticity assumption in our setting, we 
model the group-wise multiplicative heteroscedasticity by including firm size and 
industry dummies.22 The Tobit models are estimated as follows: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖
∗ = 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖,            𝜖𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)  (4.3.2) 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖 = {
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖
∗  𝑖𝑓 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖 > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (4.3.3) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖 represents the non-negative observable innovation performance 
variable; this variable captures the radical innovation and incremental innovation 
                                                 
22 We therefore estimated the heteroscedasticity-robust model by a maximum likelihood 
function in which we replace the homoscedastic standard error term σ with σi = 
σexp(Z’α) in the likelihood function. 
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performance for the firm 𝑖. 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖 corresponds to the latent dependent 
variable 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖
∗ if this variable is above zero and to zero otherwise. Finally, 
to avoid direct simultaneity, we run our analysis by allowing for time lags 
between the simultaneous diversification, sequential adaptation and output 
measures, as shown in Figure 2. 
4.3.3 Measures 
Dependent variables 
We measure three different innovation outcomes to account for the different types 
of innovation objectives of firms. First, the relative technological potential 
(RELTECHPOT) captures reflections on pushing the technological capabilities of 
a firm above the industry average and thereby closer to the technological frontier 
of an industry (Teece et al., 1997; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). A dummy 
variable takes the value of one if the relative technological potential is above this 
threshold. Therefore, the level of the general technological potential of a firm 
reflects the level of scientific and technological knowledge available to it for 
conducting innovation activities (Kogut, 1988; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Mowery et 
al., 1996).   
In addition, two further outcome variables indicate the firm’s sales 
performance with innovative products and measure the commercial success of its 
innovation activities. In line with the previous literature (see, for instance, Laursen 
and Salter (2006)), we distinguish between radical and incremental innovation 
performance. Following Meuer et al. (2015), radical innovation performance 
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(RADICAL) is measured as the firm’s sales share of radical innovative products, 
i.e., products that are new to the firm, to the total turnover. Similarly, the 
incremental innovation performance (INCREMENTAL) is measured as the 
fraction of the firm’s turnover with incremental innovative products, i.e., products 
that are significantly improved. 
Main explanatory variables 
As a central part of our conceptual model, we account for the firm’s 
diversification and adaptation strategies to search for external sources of 
knowledge through external collaboration partners. Therefore, we include various 
variables to capture our concepts of simultaneous partner diversification and 
sequential partner adaptation.  
As a starting point, we introduce the variable DIVERSIFICATION to capture 
the firm’s simultaneous collaboration pattern. To construct this variable, we use 
information about firms’ different R&D collaboration agreements with external 
collaboration partners such as suppliers, customers, clients, competitors, 
universities, and other research institutes. Following Belderbos et al. (2004a), we 
aggregate this information and create three dummy variables that are each equal to 
1 if a firm collaborates with a specific partner type. More precisely, we 
differentiate between vertical (VERT, suppliers, clients or customers), horizontal 
(HOR, competitors), and institutional scientific partner types (SCIE). Then, the 
simultaneous diversification pattern (DIVERSIFICATION) is uniquely defined by 
eight different combinations as shown in Figure 2. Consequently, the 
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simultaneous partner diversification variable represents the complementarities 
between different partner type structures and the diversification within a firm’s 
collaboration pattern (see Figure 2). 
However, we do not stop at the simultaneous pattern; we also take dynamic 
behavior into account. With respect to this second concept, the sequential partner 
adaptation (ADAPTATION) analyzes what happens if a firm changes its 
collaboration pattern between two points in time (t0-4 and t0-1). Thus, the 
sequential ADAPTATION accounts for a firm modifying or locking down its 
pattern between two periods (i.e., times t0-4 and t0-1). Accordingly, a sequential 
adaptation in the firm’s collaboration pattern can be described by seven different 
sequential adaptation strategies: a firm can remain persistent within its pattern or 
it can open to or shun horizontal, scientific, and vertical partner types (see Figure 
2).  
Overall, the introduction of these two new concepts captures the diversification 
and sequential adaptation of firms’ collaboration patterns, which will enhance our 
understanding of the mechanisms between external knowledge sourcing and the 
innovation outcomes of firms. 
Further controls  
In our analysis, we further control for various factors that may influence firms’ 
innovation outcomes. We include a measure for the firm’s R&D investments: they 
are measured as the firm’s R&D expenditures relative to its total turnover 
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(RDINT). This measure accounts for the firm’s R&D activities, thereby reflecting 
its general absorptive capacity and ability to conduct innovative activities. The 
receipt of public support is indicated by a dummy (PUBSUB). A previous 
reception of a public grant signals relevant competences and capabilities to 
successfully conduct R&D projects to other partner firms, and hence, may affect 
innovation success.  
Furthermore, we include the firm age (FIRMAGE) and (the log of) the firm 
size (LNFIRMSIZE) to capture relevant firm characteristics. Moreover, we include 
the squared term of the two previously mentioned variables to take a non-linear 
relationship into account (FIRMAGE2, LNFIRMSIZE2). In addition, we control 
for whether or not a firm belongs to a foreign group (FOREIGN), as foreign group 
members may show higher innovative performance due to spillovers from 
international group members. We also control for the foreign market activities of 
a firm. Highly export-oriented firms may be more innovative due to higher 
international competition than firms exclusively operating on a national market. 
We include a variable measuring the export share of the total turnover (EXPORT).  
Moreover, seven industry-sector dummies account for the different 
propensities to innovate across sectors. Finally, we include six survey-year 
dummies in our set of control variables to control for time shocks. 
  
Innovation outcomes and partner-type selection in R&D alliances  
 
115 
4.3.4 Descriptive results 
Relevant variables 
Table 19 reports descriptive statistics about the relevant variables for our analysis. 
The table shows that on average, firms generate approximately 7.0 % of their total 
turnover with radical innovative products, whereas 8.2 % of the turnover can be 
attributed to incremental innovative products. Moreover, 50.8 % of the firms in 
our sample innovate, 37.6 % conduct R&D activities, and 14.2 % collaborate in 
R&D alliances. Among the firms in our sample, 8.6 % collaborate with partners 
from scientific institutes, 13.0 % collaborate with vertical partners, and 4.4 % 
collaborate with horizontal partners. On average, the firms in our sample are 
rather large (mean: 257 employees) and old (mean: 67 years). In addition, 85.1 % 
of the firms are SMEs. Further descriptive statistics of the industry and firm-size-
class distribution are provided in Table 24 and Table 25 in Appendix 4.6.  
Simultaneous partner diversification 
After examining the descriptive results regarding the simultaneous partner 
diversification strategies in Table 20, we recognize that the predominant pattern in 
our sample is non-collaboration. After differentiating between firm size classes, 
the table shows that large firms collaborate more than SMEs. Diversification 
strategies that include vertical partners are frequently used, particularly within 
large firms. Moreover, large firms most frequently collaborate with scientific and 
vertical partners or all three partner types. Contrarily, SMEs are predominantly 
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engaged in R&D alliances composed by scientific and vertical partner types or 
vertical partners alone. 
Sequential partner adaptation  
Focusing on sequential partner adaptation, our sample demonstrates that the 
most predominant strategy for firms is remaining persistent (see Table 21). This 
pattern appears particularly valid for SMEs, while large firms adapt their 
knowledge sourcing strategies more often. Overall, we observe the most frequent 
adaptations in R&D alliances towards opening up to or shunning vertical partner 
types.  
Table 19: Descriptive statistics of the relevant variables.  
 Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
1 RADICAL 3993 6.951 13.665 0 100 
2 INCREMENTAL 3993 8.208 15.580 0 100 
3 RELTECHPOT 3993 0.522 0.500 0 1 
4 R&D 3993 0.376 0.485 0 1 
5 COLLABORATION 3993 0.142 0.349 0 1 
6 INNO 3993 0.508 0.500 0 1 
7 SCIENCE 3993 0.086 0.280 0 1 
8 VERTICAL 3993 0.130 0.337 0 1 
9 HORIZONTAL 3993 0.044 0.205 0 1 
10 RDINT 3993 1.118 4.748 0 178.79 
11 FIRMSIZE 3993 256.821 1749.612 1 43038 
12 FIRMAGE 3993 67.401 42.146 2 614 
13 EXPORT 3993 22.451 33.522 0 100 
14 FOREIGN 3993 0.148 0.355 0 1 
15 SUBSIDY 3993 0.059 0.235 0 1 
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Table 20: Descriptive statistics on simultaneous partner diversifications according 
to firm size classes.  
Simultaneous  
DIVERSIFICATION 
Full sample  Small-medium  Large firms 
STRATEGY: (S V H) Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent 
0: (0 0 0) 3,429 85.88  3014 88.65  415 69.98 
1: (0 0 H) 13 0.33  10 0.29  3 0.51 
2: (0 V 0) 126 3.16  102 3.00  24 4.05 
3: (S 0 0) 16 0.4  12 0.35  4 0.67 
4: (0 V H) 74 1.85  56 1.65  18 3.04 
5: (S 0 H) 8 0.2  7 0.21  1 0.17 
6: (S V 0) 225 5.63  138 4.06  87 14.67 
7: (S V H) 102 2.55  61 1.79  41 6.91 
Total 3,993 100  3,400 100  593 100 
 
 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics on sequential partner adaptations according to 
firm size classes. 
  Full sample  Small-medium  Large firms 
Sequential ADAPTATION Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent 
 0 persistent 3,322 83.20  2906 85.47  416 70.15 
closing  {
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 horizontal 38 0.95  28 0.82  10 1.69 
2 scientific 38 0.95  29 0.85  9 1.52 
3 vertical 257 6.44  187 5.50  70 11.80 
opening {
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 horizontal 37 0.93  23 0.68  14 2.36 
5 scientific 44 1.10  33 0.97  11 1.85 
6 vertical 257 6.44  194 5.71  63 10.62 
 Total 3,993 100  3,400 100  593 100 
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4.4 Empirical results  
Table 22 presents the results of the regressions models, which reflect the role of 
simultaneous partner diversifications and sequential partner adaptations for 
different innovation outcomes. For the effects of simultaneous partner 
diversification, we find strong support for our first hypothesis, which indicates the 
presence of important selectivity effects. Precisely, our results indicate that certain 
simultaneous compositions of collaboration partners are more appropriate for 
specific innovation outcomes than others.  
If firms intend to increase their relative technological potential (PROBIT model), 
we can state that scientific or horizontal partners are appropriate partner types in 
R&D alliances. However, to unfold the benefits, these partner types need to be 
complemented with vertical partners. Highly diversified collaboration patterns in 
R&D alliances that include collaborations with all three partner types are linked 
with the highest probability of increasing a firm’s relative technological potential.  
With respect to our innovation performance measures, our analysis highlights 
that a pure vertical collaboration without any complementary partner is positively 
associated with performance gains in radical and incremental innovation output. 
Interestingly, a pure horizontal collaboration is negatively linked to an 
incremental innovation outcome, which may indicate potential leaks of knowledge 
or product collusion problems in the output market. 
Scientific and horizontal collaborations only exhibit positive effects on radical 
and incremental innovation performance if they are complemented with vertical 
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partners. Highly diversified patterns in R&D alliances composed by 
collaborations with scientific, horizontal and vertical partners also show positive 
effects on both types of innovation performance outcome. Notably, we find that a 
collaboration in R&D alliances with scientific partners or horizontal partners 
needs to be complemented with other partner types (i.e., with vertical partners) to 
enhance the positive effect on both types of innovation performance. This result is 
in contrast to vertical collaboration, which does not need to be complemented 
with other partner types. Overall, these results confirm our expectations about the 
presence of important selectivity issues with respect to the simultaneous partner 
diversification (Hypothesis 4.1). 
Second, for the role of sequential partner adaptations in R&D alliances for 
firms’ innovation outcomes, in accordance with our expectations the results 
generally show that firms can benefit through a sequential change in collaboration 
patterns (Hypothesis 4.2). However, not all of the results point in the same 
direction, and hence, hypothesis two can only partly be supported. For instance, 
we see that ending a scientific collaboration is negatively linked to the probability 
of enhancing the relative technological potential of a firm. Despite this negative 
impact, we mainly find positive effects of adaptation on innovation outcomes 
compared to remaining persistent.  
These ambiguous results motivate us to more closely examine the partner-
specific adaptation effects (Hypothesis 4.3). In this vein, our analysis unveils 
positive effects of ending scientific and horizontal collaborations for incremental 
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innovation performance, indicating that these types of collaboration may not be 
the most appropriate partner type to collaborate with if firms intend to 
incrementally innovate. Furthermore, our results show positive effects of opening 
a horizontal collaboration for radical innovation outcomes. Finally, collaborating 
with vertical partners is overall positively linked with all three innovation 
outcome measures and seems to be an essential source of knowledge in R&D 
alliances. Ultimately, these results support hypothesis three of this paper by 
indicating significant partner selectivity effects. 
 
Innovation outcomes and partner-type selection in R&D alliances  
 
121 
Table 22: Regression estimates for innovation outcomes accounting for 
simultaneous partner diversification and sequential partner adaptation.  
   Innovation outcomes 
 
  Probit  Random Effects Tobit 
 
Explanatory variables  RELTECHPOT  RADICAL INCREMENTAL 
DIVERSIFICATION (S V H) 0:  (.)  (.) (.) 
 1: (0 0 H)  0.397  9.653 -21.842*** 
   (0.468)  (6.288) (8.458) 
 2: (0 V 0)  0.266  10.296*** 11.265*** 
   (0.174)  (2.499) (2.968) 
 3: (S 0 0)  0.307  -2.569 -10.411 
   (0.336)  (5.772) (7.300) 
 4: (0 V H)  0.544**  11.171*** 16.148*** 
   (0.217)  (3.237) (3.728) 
 5: (S 0 H)  0.476  13.822 2.766 
   (0.530)  (8.689) (11.441) 
 6: (S V 0)  0.672***  7.189*** 7.074*** 
   (0.155)  (1.985) (2.415) 
 7: (S V H)  0.809***  8.497*** 7.828** 
   (0.255)  (2.804) (3.397) 
ADAPTATION  0: persistent  (.)  (.) (.) 
closing 
1 horizontal  0.014  -1.792 12.616** 
  (0.361)  (4.262) (5.204) 
2 scientific   -0.447*  6.400 9.237* 
  (0.254)  (4.066) (4.857) 
3 vertical  -0.223  0.953 0.397 
  (0.164)  (2.128) (2.536) 
opening 
4 horizontal  -0.019  6.894* 4.721 
  (0.272)  (3.521) (4.425) 
5 scientific  0.169  2.055 1.711 
  (0.242)  (3.642) (4.246) 
6 vertical  0.357***  11.237*** 16.543*** 
  (0.100)  (1.515) (1.817) 
 CONTROLS  [YES]  [YES] [YES] 
 TIME DUMMIES  [YES]  [YES] [YES] 
 INDUSTRY DUMMIES  [YES]  [YES] [YES] 
 No. of observations  3,993  3,993 3,993 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as firms appear more than once in the sample. The 
time and industry dummies are jointly significant (not presented). ***, **, and * indicate significance levels 
of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Firm size 
In the next step of our analysis, we investigate the effectiveness of inter-
organizational knowledge exchange structures that depend on the sizes of firms. 
Table 23 reports the results of simultaneous partner diversification and sequential 
partner adaptation after differentiating between SMEs and large firms.  
Overall, our results demonstrate that the partner structure impacts the 
innovation performance differently according to the firm size (Hypothesis 4.4). 
With regard to horizontal collaboration, pure horizontal collaboration represents 
an appropriate means for large firms to achieve high relative technological 
potential. However, this type of collaboration demonstrates negative effects on 
incremental innovation performance. Thus, although a horizontal collaboration is 
an essential source to gain technology potential, it comprises severe risks and 
threats for the economical commercialization if this collaboration engagement is 
undertaken to generate outcomes with only a minor degree of innovation novelty.  
With respect to small firms, collaboration patterns that exclusively include 
vertical partner types are positively associated with higher relative technological 
potential, radical and incremental innovation performance, while this inter-
organizational knowledge sourcing and transfer structure does not exhibit 
significant effects for large firms. In line with the full firm sample results, we 
cannot detect any statistically significant positive effect of a scientific 
collaboration if it is not complemented with other partner types for SMEs as well 
as for large firms. This finding highlights that this source of external knowledge 
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alone enhances neither the relative technological potential of a firm nor its 
economical innovation performance. Consequently, this finding shows that 
scientific partners need complementary types of partners to exploit the knowledge 
received through scientific partners. 
Next, we focus on the results of diversified patterns that are composed by more 
than one partner type. To begin with SMEs, our analysis shows that horizontal 
collaboration complemented with vertical partner types seems to be an effective 
external knowledge sourcing structure. This structure can not only enhance the 
relative technological potential, it can also boost the economical innovation 
performance with radical and incremental innovative products. Moreover, if it is 
complemented with a vertical partner, a scientific collaboration is positively 
associated with higher relative technological potential and radical innovation 
performance. Notably, inter-organizational R&D alliances composed by highly 
diversified partner structures composed of all three partner types are positively 
linked with a higher relative technological potential as well as with higher radical 
and incremental innovation performance. 
For large firms, collaboration constellations with scientific and vertical partner 
types positively affect the relative technological potential and incremental 
innovation performance. Interestingly, large firms generally do not benefit to the 
same extent from the complementarity effects created from external partner types 
to enhance the firms’ technological potential and innovation performance as 
SMEs. This finding highlights the scarcity of resources in SMEs, and hence, it 
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indicates that collaboration may be an appropriate means for SMEs to confront 
these problems.  
In shedding light on the sequential partner adaptation, our study detects 
substantial firm size effects. For instance, closing down a scientific collaboration 
is negatively linked with the relative technological potential, but positively 
associated with incremental innovation performance for SMEs. For large firms, no 
significant effect is found for any of the outcome variables. Although a scientific 
collaboration is an important source for higher relative technological potential for 
SMEs, these results point to the difficulties SMEs face in exploiting knowledge 
from scientific collaborations particularly if this inter-organizational knowledge 
exchange is supposed to foster incremental innovations. Contrarily, if large firms 
adapt their collaboration patterns and open up to scientific partners, our results 
shows positive effects for the relative technological potential as well as for both 
types of innovation performance. These results indicate that large firms are able to 
create benefits from collaborations with scientific partners for any type of 
innovation outcome. Hence, this knowledge and learning channel to scientific 
partners constitutes an important source of the competitive advantage of large 
firms.  
With respect to SMEs, sequential adaptations in the form of opening toward 
horizontal collaboration partners show a positive effect on the radical innovation 
performance. This finding indicates that SMEs can benefit from joint 
collaborations with competitors for radical innovation to establish new 
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technologies or standards and to create new output markets for these radical 
innovations. The insignificant effects for this sequential adaptation strategy for 
large firms may derive from the fact that large firms have less need for other 
external partners to shape these output markets.  
Another interesting effect of sequential adaptation related to horizontal 
collaboration concerns large firms: closing down horizontal partnerships is linked 
to increased incremental innovation performance. This result shows that 
collaborations with competitors may harm large firms if the associated innovation 
outcome is incremental. This possibility may be due to potential collusion in the 
subsequent product market, increased leakage of knowledge to competitors, or 
ineffective appropriation mechanisms. Overall, we can conclude that the above 
findings with respect to the firm size are generally consistent with hypothesis 
four. 
  
  
Table 23: Regression estimates for the innovation outcomes accounting for simultaneous partner diversifications and sequential 
partner adaptations and differentiating between small-medium-sized and large firms.  
   Innovation outcomes 
   SMALL MEDIUM FIRMS  LARGE FIRMS 
 
  Probit  Random Effects Tobit  Probit  Random Effects Tobit 
 
Explanatory variables  RELTECHPOT  RADICAL INCREMENTAL  RELTECHPOT  RADICAL INCREMENTAL 
DIVERSIFICATION  0  (S V H)  (.)  (.) (.)  (.)  (.) (.) 
 1: (0 0 H)  0.132  7.171 -18.252  0.000  14.562 -27.061** 
   (0.549)  (8.639) (11.859)  (.)  (10.004) (11.011) 
 2: (0 V 0)  0.370*  14.651*** 13.994***  0.129  -1.899 -4.819 
   (0.203)  (3.113) (3.590)  (0.340)  (4.497) (5.317) 
 3: (S 0 0)  0.615  -5.676 -11.158  -0.858  -1.126 -16.821 
   (0.431)  (7.131) (8.874)  (0.699)  (9.912) (11.853) 
 4: (0 V H)  0.699***  15.747*** 15.577***  0.142  -2.587 8.225 
   (0.241)  (3.990) (4.605)  (0.487)  (5.362) (5.699) 
 5: (S 0 H)  0.444  5.232 -8.320  0.000  47.442 29.370 
   (0.564)  (9.728) (12.745)  (.)  (32.416) (36.158) 
 6: (S V 0)  0.640***  9.135*** 4.854  0.830***  4.268 8.290** 
   (0.205)  (2.884) (3.383)  (0.236)  (2.704) (3.316) 
 7: (S V H)  1.305***  8.999** 9.593**  0.493  5.015 0.649 
   (0.306)  (3.924) (4.503)  (0.390)  (3.942) (4.910) 
  
ADAPTATION  0 persistent           
closing 
1 horizontal  0.311  -2.959 9.265  -0.265  5.058 16.098** 
  (0.462)  (5.760) (6.889)  (0.558)  (6.396) (7.569) 
2 scientific  -0.632**  7.831 10.441*  0.223  -2.335 4.720 
  (0.318)  (5.027) (5.822)  (0.511)  (7.175) (9.104) 
3 vertical  -0.350*  -1.577 1.275  -0.039  4.664 0.142 
  (0.198)  (2.845) (3.295)  (0.297)  (3.195) (3.919) 
opening 
4 horizontal  0.045  9.830** 8.050  -0.235  6.067 0.353 
  (0.324)  (4.972) (6.199)  (0.489)  (4.976) (5.906) 
5 scientific  -0.118  -3.752 -5.665  0.000  16.626*** 20.200*** 
  (0.268)  (4.481) (5.176)  (.)  (6.411) (7.000) 
6 vertical  0.253**  12.230*** 15.494***  0.846***  8.986*** 15.089*** 
  (0.110)  (1.840) (2.143)  (0.250)  (2.576) (3.307) 
 CONTROLS  [YES]  [YES] [YES]  [YES]  [YES] [YES] 
 TIME DUMMIES  [YES]  [YES] [YES]  [YES]  [YES] [YES] 
 INDUSTRY DUMMIES  [YES]  [YES] [YES]  [YES]  [YES] [YES] 
 No. of observations  3,400  3,400 3,400  569  593 593 
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4.5 Discussions, implications and concluding remarks  
4.5.1 Discussion 
As a response to today’s highly competitive and rapidly changing environment, 
which includes shorter product cycles and time to market, firms need to adapt 
effectively to meet these challenges (Bakker & Knoben, 2014; Mohammed & 
Nadkarni, 2011). One of the response strategies for many firms is to form 
strategic inter-organizational R&D alliances with external collaborating partners. 
This study extends the conceptual understanding of inter-organizational structures 
of external knowledge exchanges and technology transfers within R&D alliances. 
To that end, we introduce two new concepts, namely, simultaneous partner 
diversification and sequential partner adaptation.  
The introduction of these concepts should help achieve a better evaluation of 
the managerial choices of strategies to organize external knowledge sourcing and 
transfers through collaboration to effectively meet specific innovation objectives. 
As we expected, these knowledge-sourcing strategies vary based on the firm size. 
By accounting for the effects of dynamic search behavior within R&D alliances, 
our study responds to calls for more research how firms organize their external 
searches for innovation (Bakker & Knoben, 2014; Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Kale 
& Singh, 2009; Laursen & Salter, 2014). In our framework, we argue that specific 
simultaneous diversification patterns of firms are more appropriate to achieving 
different types of innovation outcomes. In this vein, we expect that firms that 
manage to organize their external searches with the best potential 
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complementarity mix between the focal firms’ resources, capabilities, and 
innovation objectives and their partners’ resources and know-how show superior 
performance.  
As previous literature has noted, there is a lack of openness of firms to their 
external environment (Chesbrough, 2003b; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Hence, firms 
that over-focus on internal search activities may generally behave too persistently 
within their search processes. This myopic and persistent behavior may limit the 
adaptations of firms to external changes in technology and markets. Therefore, we 
have introduced a dynamic framework suggesting that firms that effectively adapt 
their organizational knowledge structure of external linkages according to their 
current pattern and innovation objectives show superior performance outcomes.  
We examine the role of simultaneous partner diversification on different 
innovation output measures to gain further insights on how external linkages to 
heterogeneous collaboration partner types affect innovation outcomes. Therefore, 
our study confirms and extends the previous research on the effects of 
complementarities between collaboration partner types (Belderbos et al., 2006). In 
particular, our results highlight the importance of selectivity in collaboration 
partner types according to specific innovation outcomes and the firm size. For 
instance, collaboration with scientific partners needs to be complemented to have 
positive effects on innovation outcomes. By collaborating with scientific partners, 
firms may gain access to new ideas, scientific workforces and new technology. 
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However, to make these collaborations effective for innovation outcomes this 
knowledge and technology need to be complemented with other partner types. 
This finding shows that although collaboration with science is an important 
source for the relative technological potential for SMEs and large firms, this 
collaboration type needs to be complemented with vertical partner (or vertical and 
horizontal partner) types to economically exploit radical and incremental 
innovation outcomes. This need may hint at ineffective appropriation mechanisms 
in the case of a purely scientific collaboration.  
Similar characteristics appear to be valid for horizontal collaborations. 
Complemented horizontal collaborations with vertical (and scientific) partners are 
positively associated with innovation outcomes of either type. Along with pure 
scientific collaborations, pure horizontal collaborations are negatively linked with 
incremental innovation outcomes. This linkage indicates severe problems with 
this type of collaboration partner if it is used for innovation activities with only 
minor product novelty. The innovation monopoly, and hence, the producer rent of 
a pure horizontal collaboration may not be high enough for incremental 
innovation activities to fully cover involuntary outgoing spillovers and potential 
product collusion problems with competitors; these issues may explain the 
negative effects. These insights regarding horizontal collaboration enhance the 
discussions about opportunistic behavior versus learning in R&D alliances (Kale, 
Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000). 
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Contrary to scientific and horizontal collaborations, vertical collaborations do 
not need to be complemented with other partner types to exploit innovation 
performance. Our results particularly emphasize that SMEs can benefit through 
vertical collaboration; surprisingly, SMEs can also increase their technological 
potential by means of a vertical collaboration. In line with our expectations, firms 
do not face tremendous difficulties exploiting and exploring knowledge through 
collaboration channels with vertical partners.  
Focusing on firm size effects, we can state that SMEs show more positive 
effects of partner diversification associated with innovation outcomes compared 
to large firms. These findings confirm and extend previous empirical studies 
(Beck & Schenker–Wicki, 2014) and show that SMEs can substantially benefit 
from the complementarities gained from external sources of knowledge in their 
innovation activities. Consequently, the means of partner diversification can allow 
SMEs to effectively bypass their lack of internal sources compared to large firms.  
To examine how firms dynamically adapt their inter-organizational structure of 
knowledge sourcing and transfer in R&D alliances, we introduce the concept of 
sequential partner adaptation. Our results reveal that dynamic adaptation is an 
appropriate measure to confront problems related to path dependency and 
remaining too persistently within firms’ previous knowledge sourcing strategies. 
In general, we found positive associations between closing down transfer channels 
from horizontal and scientific partners for incremental innovation performance. 
These findings demonstrate that those partner types may not provide the most 
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appropriate knowledge sourcing channels to enhance incremental innovation 
performance. Furthermore, we found positive relationships between opening 
channels to horizontal partners and radical innovation performance, and between 
opening vertical channels and all types of innovation outcomes. One exception to 
these positive relationships concerns our finding for closing down channels to 
scientific partners. Here, we found negative correlations to the firms’ relative 
technological potential, indicating that knowledge that is derived from scientific 
collaborations is an important prerequisite for superior technological potential. 
Our analysis supports our expectations about the presence of major firm-size 
effects reflecting the sequential partner adaptations in R&D alliances. Contrary to 
SMEs, for large firms beginning a scientific collaboration is positively related to 
the relative technological potential and innovation performance with radical and 
incremental innovative products. Hence, knowledge sourcing through scientific 
partners represents an important source of innovation opportunities for large 
firms. As our results show, large firms can significantly benefit from installing 
these knowledge transfer channels to scientific partners. Apparently, they have the 
capabilities to create, manage and retain these new inter-organizational linkages 
effectively.  
Furthermore, our analysis reveals that large firms are able to benefit through 
closing channels to horizontal partners in terms of incremental innovation 
performance. Thus, collaboration with competitors may harm large firms if this 
type of collaboration is associated with projects that only have incremental 
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novelty. Potential collusion in the product output market and involuntarily leaking 
knowledge to competing firms may explain these results. Contrary to large firms, 
opening up a horizontal collaboration is positively correlated with radical 
innovation performance outcomes for SMEs. This correlation indicates that SMEs 
can benefit from joint innovation activities with competitors to establish new 
technologies and markets for radical innovations. Given our results, large firms 
may be more able to derive this result on their own. By reflecting this role of the 
inclusion and exclusion of horizontal collaboration in the knowledge exchange 
process in R&D alliances, our study provides new insights in a field where there 
is a call for more research concerning the potentially opportunistic behavior of 
competitors in the innovation process (Laursen & Salter, 2014). In summation, 
our study highlights the importance of simultaneous and sequential partner-type 
selections in R&D alliances and the importance of adapting collaboration 
strategies according to changing external environments. 
4.5.2 Implications and concluding remarks 
The earlier literature on R&D alliances has elaborated on the understanding of 
how firms organize their external innovation search activities (Katila & Ahuja, 
2002; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Laursen & Salter, 2014). However, as suggested by 
Laursen and Salter (2006) and Bakker and Knoben (2014), more research is 
needed to better understand the performance implications when firms change their 
innovative search behavior over time. Our framework explores how sequential 
changes in firms’ search strategies affect their innovation performance. Therefore, 
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we follow Laursen and Salter (2006), who refer to this problem as a “key 
managerial challenge” (p. 147), and we investigate whether firms that adapt their 
search behavior over time to respond to major changes in the environment can 
exhibit better performance compared to those firms that remain persistent in the 
same search strategy. The present study identified appropriate simultaneous 
diversification and sequential adaptations strategies to achieve specific innovation 
outcomes. In this context, the findings of our study should help managers to 
develop effective re-configurations of firms’ inter-organizational knowledge 
sourcing structures according to different innovation objectives.  
Indeed, our analysis emphasizes that managerial decision makers should be 
aware of the risk of remaining too persistent and path-dependent within the same 
search activities. The attitude of non-adapting inter-organizational knowledge 
exchange strategies could lead to inferior performance. However, our analysis 
also highlights the need for an appropriate fit between the partners in R&D 
alliances in terms of their innovation objectives and firm sizes. Thus, a careful 
evaluation of the potential returns and risks of collaboration is required.  
4.5.3 Future research and limitations 
Given the nature of our data, we have to be careful about claims of causality. 
While establishing causality is crucial in order to verify theory, this was not the 
scope of our project. Furthermore, we strongly believe it is just as important to 
enhance theories based on correlations, if the later allow analyzing the dynamics 
that have thus far not received the needed attention in the literature (Arora et al., 
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2014). However, future avenues of research should account for the selection into 
collaboration in order to be able to derive stronger claims of causality.  
Moreover, this study focuses on the sequential adaptation of the innovative 
search behavior of firms, and it can only partly capture a full understanding of 
dynamic firm behavior. Further improvements in data collection could allow 
researchers to follow a large set of firms over a longer timeframe, which would 
permit them to take long-term effects into account. Furthermore, having a longer 
timespan would allow researchers to consider whether experience with the same 
partner impacts the way firms choose to adapt their partner constellations. Future 
research could extend the understanding of which mechanisms moderate the 
adaptation of inter-organization knowledge structures in R&D alliances. For 
instance, further future studies could analyze the impact of different adaptation 
strategies across technological trajectories, as such strategies may be highly 
sector-specific (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). In addition, 
further research on inter-organizational knowledge creation from different 
perspectives such as organizational learning, knowledge and intellectual property 
management is needed to attain an integrated understanding of how firms 
organize their searches for innovation. 
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4.6 Appendix 
 
Table 24: Descriptive statistics, industry distribution. 
Industry Number of firms Percent 
1 Construction, mining, energy 496 12.42 
2 Consumer goods (food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing) 261 6.54 
3 Intermediate goods (paper, printing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
rubber, plastics, minerals, basic metals) 607 15.20 
4 Investment goods (fabricated metals, machinery & equipment, 
electrical equipment, electronics and optical products, medical 
instruments, watches, vehicles, and other manufacturing) 1,203 30.13 
5 Traditional services (trade, transportation, telecommunications) 750 18.78 
6 Knowledge-based services (banking, insurance, information 
technology & services, technical commercial services)  503 12.60 
7 Other services 173 4.33 
Total 3,993 100 
 
 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics, firm size distribution. 
Size class Size class distribution Number of firms Percent 
1 Small-sized firms 1 – 49 1,918 48.03 
2 Medium-sized 50 – 249 1,482 37.11 
3 Large-sized 250 – max. 593 14.85 
 Total 3,993 100 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
5.1 Summary and conclusions 
Innovation policies generate headlines in political agendas, as demonstrated by 
the Europe 2020 strategy from the European Commission. However, discussions 
on innovation policies are not only made by policymakers at the very top national 
or international level but also appear at the local and regional levels. The recent 
discussions on the foundation of the Swiss innovation park in the Zurich 
metropolitan area are one example of this vertical permeability of innovation 
topics.23 In addition, the frequency with which subjects concerning innovation are 
discussed appears to grow steadily. Given the challenges of international and 
national competitiveness, the public pays serious attention to innovation policies, 
and increasingly, more stakeholders show interest in the design and evaluation of 
innovation policies.  
This dissertation’s objective is to advance the comprehension of innovation 
policies. This thesis is composed of three empirical studies that analyze the role of 
public innovation policies for firm innovation investments and outcomes. The 
                                                 
23 More information on the Swiss Innovation Park can be found in Sauter, Geilinger, and 
Krogh (2014). 
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objective of this work is not to demonstrate how innovation in firms can be 
planned in detail by innovation policies, but to outline the basic conditions under 
which innovation policies may stimulate the generation of innovations in the 
private sector. In particular, this dissertation contributes to the literature in the 
following manner. 
First, the study in chapter two shows that a public innovation support policy, 
which directly funds private R&D projects, can help to increase R&D investments 
in the private sector and to stimulate innovations of a radical nature. This result 
reveals that public innovation policies are an effective means to confront 
problems related to market failure in R&D and innovation activities. In addition, 
and most notably, this study highlights that the public policy under review is 
effective in orienting R&D efforts in the private sector to socially favorable 
objectives such as stimulating radical innovation projects.  
Second, this thesis, in chapter three, focuses on the relationship between 
diversity of collaboration partner types and innovation performance. The findings 
note that firms, and in particular small firms, can benefit from diversity in 
strategic R&D alliances. However, firms should be aware of decreasing marginal 
returns from diversity, which indicate that excessive diversity is linked to 
significant disadvantages, such as high costs and risks, due to increased 
coordination effort or to ineffective appropriation of joint activities. Although this 
result points to substantial benefits through diversified R&D collaboration, it also 
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suggests that managers should carefully select their collaboration partners and 
evaluate the gains and risks of collaboration.  
Third, in chapter four, this study investigates the role of simultaneous 
diversification and sequential adaptation of collaboration partner types within 
R&D alliances for specific innovation outcomes. In contrast to previous studies, 
which mainly ignore dynamic aspects, this approach accounts for the sequential 
adaptation of collaboration patterns; this makes a substantial contribution to the 
literature on organizational learning. The findings emphasize that firms should not 
remain extremely persistent within their search activities, and should adapt their 
inter-organizational knowledge exchange structures to avoid inferior performance. 
Moreover, this study generally highlights important partner type selection issues 
and identifies appropriate collaboration strategies in relation to specific innovation 
outcomes and firm sizes. The knowledge that specific compositions of 
complementary collaboration partners are more appropriate for certain innovation 
outcomes should increase the awareness of managers to select appropriate 
partners in their innovation activities. Overall, we argue that the appropriate 
selection and use of external partners increases the flexibility to adjust to specific 
innovation strategies, and thus constitutes a source for change in organizations to 
adapt to changing environments.   
The empirical studies show how innovation policies can stimulate the 
generation of knowledge and innovations in organizations. By elucidating the 
pending questions regarding the effects of innovation polices, this thesis provides 
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meaningful implications for decision-makers in politics and organizations; in 
addition, it enlarges the theoretical reasoning on organizational learning and 
innovation strategy. 
5.2 Limitations and future research 
The three empirical analyses presented in this dissertation focus on special issues, 
and hence only partly grasp how innovation policies affect the generation of 
knowledge and innovation. To further enlarge the understanding of innovation 
policies, this section proposes avenues for future research.  
The analysis of public innovation policies, such as direct R&D subsidies or 
R&D collaboration, leads to many questions. As always, the capacity to address 
the questions depends on the availability and the quality of data. The access to full 
panel data and the ability to track specific firms over time would allow us to 
analyze the impact of a subsidy in a before-and-after setting, which enables the 
use of difference-in-difference estimation methods. Moreover, the availability of 
information regarding rejected applicants from the subsidy application process 
would be helpful to refine the analysis to strengthen the empirical findings.  
In addition to improving data availability, further areas of future research are 
also promising. For instance, the analysis could extend to compare the 
effectiveness of different policy designs such as tax incentives versus direct and 
indirect subsidies. Although the empirical studies in this dissertation examined 
how innovation policies affect firm innovation performance, these studies did not 
investigate the effects of these policies on social welfare. Therefore, future 
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research should also address the role of innovation policies for employment and 
productivity growth. Hence, in this context, future studies could contribute to the 
more general debate on the social return of R&D and innovation (Jones & 
Williams, 1998; Mazzucato, 2014). 
Last, as organizations encounter an increasing challenge to adapt to new 
technologies and markets, it will be interesting to observe how innovation policies 
manage to adjust to changing environments and organizational needs. 
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